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For decades economists have attempted to study and understand the market structures of the
U.S. food processing and distribution industries.  Compared to the other stages of the U.S. food
system, the market structure of the grocery wholesaling industry is the least documented.  The most
comprehensive study of the U.S. food system devoted a mere 2.3 percent of its text pages to the
grocery wholesaling industries (Marion et al.). The Bureau of the Census has published concentration
data on the food manufacturing industries on a regular basis since the 1940s, and market shares from
for-profit grocery information services has increasingly become available (IRI).  In grocery retailing,
regional research groups have commissioned at great expense special tabulations of sales
concentration ratios across statistical metropolitan areas, the latest for the year 1987 (Franklin and
Cotterill).  Concentration ratios have repeatedly been discovered to have strong explanatory power
when linked to various measures of market performance (e.g., Connor et al., Cotterill, Binkley and
Connor).  The proper measurement of market sales concentration is essential for the wise
enforcement of U.S. merger laws.  The merger guidelines now is force for the major federal antitrust
agencies specify the use of pre-merger and post-merger concentration ratios as the principal criteria
for deciding whether to investigate proposed mergers in any industry (U.S. Justice Department).  The
number of U.S. grocery wholesalers acquired by other U.S. grocery wholesalers averaged about 20
per year in the 1970s (Marion et al.: 349).  The rate nearly doubled in the 1980s and early 1990s.
(ERS).  More importantly, several mergers during 1992-1996 involved leading wholesalers.
Very few published studies of grocery wholesaling concentration exist.  The U.S. national
Commission on Food Marketing studied wholesaling within various commodity subsectors, but
produced no comprehensive examination of the industry as a whole.  The last precise investigation
was an unpublished analysis of a special tabulation of the 1972 Census of Wholesale Trade prepared
by USDA economists and reported in Marion et.al.  (Page 348).  This study found that the four-firm
sales concentration ratio (CR4) for general-line food wholesalers ranged from 58 to 89 percent and
averaged 73 percent across 14 grocery marketing areas (GMA).  The GMAs were defined for such
large metropolitan areas as Boston, Cleveland, Seattle, and San Francisco.  Each GMA was
composed of from two to four census MSAs.  Concentration ratios were also calculated for
wholesalers specialized in selling meat, produce, confectionary, or the like.  Average CR4s for the
specialty wholesalers were typically much lower than for the general-line wholesalers.2
Although a pioneering study for its time, the USDA special tabulation suffers from several
limitations.  In particular, the sample of 14 GMAs was chosen for convenience rather than statistical
representativeness, and the USDA analysis was confined by certain rigid classification practices of
the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The limitations of the USDA study highlight two major problems
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facing would-be studies of wholesaler market structure.  The first issue is that there are difficulties
in identifying which types of wholesale operations are in more or less direct rivalry with one another.
Grocery warehouses are owned and operated by four fairly distinct types of companies.  First, most
large and many medium-sized grocery chains operate warehouses that are filled with goods purchased
directly from food processors (or in the case of fresh produce, wholesale packers or growers).  In
addition, most smaller chains and some “independent” (non-chain) retailers operate small warehouses
that satisfy a portion of their storage requirements while relying on other wholesalers for the bulk of
their wholesale purchases.  Second, there are merchant wholesalers, firms that store and deliver
products purchased from growers, packers, or manufacturers.  Some of the merchants are specialized
in one line of business (meat, dairy, beverages, etc.) And some are general-line merchants (sell several
lines of groceries).  The fourth type of wholesale distributor are manufacturers that vertically integrate
forward by operating their own sales and distribution centers.  These manufacturers’ sales branches
generally sell to integrated retailers or to merchant wholesalers.  A fifth kind of grocery wholesaler
does not operate a warehouse; agents and brokers sell food products for processors on a commission
basis.  Like manufacturers’ sales branches, agent and brokers tend to sell to integrated retailers or to
merchant wholesalers, while the latter two types tend to sell and deliver directly to retail
establishments each wholesaler type offers different mixes of services to client.  The complexity
induce by these four or five types of wholesalers makes market structure analysis of grocery
wholesaling particularly messy.
A second knotty analytical issue is the proper geographic delineation of wholesale grocery
markets.  The consensus among economists who have studied the issue is that neither the nation as
a whole nor units as small as MSAs.   National markets do exist for many manufactured food
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products (but most are subnational), and federal court decisions have affirmed that the MSA is a
relevant geographic market for grocery retailing.  The MSA may not be a useful building block for
identifying appropriate geographic markets for grocery wholesalers.  General-line wholesalers
generally shipped most of their products to stores within 200 miles of the warehouse, but occasional
shipments occur to clients up to 400 miles away, particularly in sparsely populated areas of the
country.  In a 1982 study of general-line wholesale establishments, the average distance of the
farthest store served was 271 miles.  Information on actual shipping patterns from warehouses to
stores would be essential to proper market delineation.  Even with such information, market borders
cannot be drawn with the utmost precision or certainty.  Rather, the resulting geographic definitions
would most likely remain probabilistic constructs or “fuzzy sets,” with gaps between markets for
areas that fall into no identifiable or unique shipping zone.
Objective
The purpose of this paper is to calculate and analyze the degree of market sales concentration
in 1990 among general-line grocery wholesalers in properly defined local U.S. markets.  Market
concentration measures the number and size distribution of independent sellers in the same industry.
High concentration results when the number of significant sellers is small or their market shares are
unequally distributed.  The primary focus of this paper is on wholesalers that distribute directly to3
grocery stores; manufacturers sales branches, wholesale agents, and brokers are outside the scope
of this report.  Consideration of geographic market definition is a necessary step in the accurate
measurement of sales concentration, so an entire section of this report is devoted to the topic.  The
second purpose is to evaluate the effects on concentration of the largest merger among grocery
wholesalers in decades, the 1992 Super Valu-Wetterau merger.
Data Sources
The principal data source is confidential “Participant Information Guides: prepared by SAMI
analysts for their own internal use.  SAMI (Selling-Areas Markets, Inc.) was the major and almost
sole rival to A.C. Nielsen Company in the business of selling data on grocery brands market shares
in the 1970s and 1980s.  Unlike Nielsen, SAMI employed “warehouse withdrawal” data to develop
market-by-market estimates of retail grocery market sales, volumes, and prices.  Beginning in 1965,
SAMI contracted with grocery warehouse operators to send magnetic tapes to SAMI’s operations
center every four weeks.  The tapes contained item-by-item shipments of grocery products from
specific warehouses to specific retail stores.  By the 1980s the number of participating warehouses
exceeded 600 nationwide, and the SAMI sample accounted for nearly 90 percent of total grocery
shipments in 54 GMAs.  The operations center consolidated the product shipments data using a
common product coding system and made projections of non-sample sales.  Over the 25 years SAMI
was in business, total sales to food manufacturers and other clients accumulated to $5 to $10 billion.
3
Food companies clearly regarded SAMI data as accurate and useful for marketing decisions.
Grocery wholesalers sell their products to two major retail outlets: food stores and
foodservice establishments.  Neither the SAMI data nor most of the Progressive Grocer Guidebook
cover shipments to foodservice outlets.  SAMI’s product tracking services were entirely focused on
retail grocery and drug stores.  The Guidebook may list wholesalers that sell a minor portion of their
4
shipments to foodservice operators, but all the retailers listed as potential buyers are grocery retailers.
Neither source lists Sysco Corp., which is by far the largest wholesaler supplying foodservice outlets
(Marion et al.).
The SAMI data cover wholesale shipments to operators grocery of supermarkets, convenience
stores, and mass-merchandise department stores.  Grocery supermarkets include conventional
supermarkets, warehouse stores, combination stores, and super stores (Connor and Schiek).  The
presence of convenience store chains in the SAMI data is signaled by a listing for Southland
Corporation, the parent company for the 7-eleven chain, which operates a couple of small
warehouses.  The Guidebook also lists wholesalers that serve convenience stores and other smaller
grocery stores.  Finally, SAMI had the participation of at least one large discount department store
chain with warehouse shipment activity centered in Missouri and nearby states.  Progressive Grocer
lists no mass-merchandise retailers either as distributors or retail buyers.
This study uses several pieces of information gleaned from the Participant Information Guides.
Each SAMI operator and warehouse is identified by name and a unique code number.  Super Valu
and its subsidiaries were given company code “0002", and A & P was assigned code “0015.”  In
addition, if one company shipped groceries to stores in a given market from two or more facilities,
each facility is usually identified by type of product or location.  For example, in the Portland, Maine
market, the Wetterau company shipped to stores in the market from two locations identified as4
“Wetterau/Portland” and “Wetterau/Keene.”  Next to each warehouse is the percentage of the
sample’s retail sales supplied by each warehouse.  In August 1990, Wetteraus’ Portland warehouse
accounted for 4.9 percent and its Keene, NH warehouse accounted for 1.9 percent of total
participants’ sales in the Portland market.  Finally, the Guides indicate which of five product lines
were being shipped into the market by the warehouse (dry grocery, meat, other refrigerated foods,
frozen foods, and HBA).  Thus, one can see that Progressive Distributors supplied 6.4 percent of
Portland’s groceries and that its sole warehouse shipped only HBAs.  On a separate sheet, SAMI
analysts estimated within a 10 percentage point range the coverage of SAMIs’ sample for each of the
five grocery product lines in each of its markets.  In Portland, SAMI participants accounted for 85
to 95 percent of all dry groceries sold in the market.
The SAMI data were cross-checked by consulting Progressive Grocer’s 1991 Marketing
Guidebook, the 24  edition of this reference handbook.  The Guidebook uses information on 90,000
th
grocery stores to develop profiles of retail chains with at least $50 million in sales and wholesalers
(merchants, brokers, and rack jobbers) of like size supplying the chains.  Information on sales, store
types, and locations is given for nearly 300 retail companies.  For nearly 100 wholesale merchants,
the Guidebook lists warehouse locations, physical sizes, products handled, and sales.  Sales are
estimated for about one-fifth of the companies, but the methods of estimation are not revealed.  For
a few companies (especially foreign owned ones like National Tea), no sales estimates are provided.
Cross checks with the SAMI lists indicate that about 10 percent of the retailers and merchant
wholesalers that meet Progressive Grocer’s size criteria are missing from the Guidebook.  Sales by
geographic “divisions” of retailers and merchants (operations that generally correspond to GMAs)
are provided sporadically.  Many HBA wholesalers listed by SAMI are missing in the Guidebook.
There are signs of carelessness in preparation of the guidebook: city names are misspelled, pages are
out of order, and sometimes company sales in a GMA exceed the total national sales of company by
a substantial margin.  There is no discussion of how sales estimates are made nor limitations of the
data presented in the Guidebook.  Consequently, this report favors the SAMI data as more accurate
and employs the Guidebook as a secondary source of information.
Methods of Analysis
The starting point is the sample market shares provided in the SAMI worksheets.  There are
696 market shares given, an average of 13 per GMA.  These shares measure the retail value of 1990
shipments from a warehouse to grocery stores located in the GMA.  Most of the warehouses are
physically located inside the GMA as well, but about one-fourth of the warehouses are located in
adjacent market areas.  Warehouses supplying only HBAs are especially likely to be located outside
the GMAs of the stores they supply.  The SAMI sample market shares are converted to retail sales
figures using SAMIs own data on grocery sales (see Appendix A) and further multiplied by the SAMI
coverage ratio (shown in Table 1 below).  Thus, the dollar figures represent retail-value wholesale
shipments to stores in the SAMI-defined GMA.
Progressive Grocer data was added for major retailers or wholesalers that were not SAMI
participants.  Sales of non-participants were adjusted downward to reflect the smaller geographic
coverage of Progressive Grocer’s GMAs as compared to SAMI’s GMAs (see next section for a
discussion).  The Progressive Grocer data provided an additional 72 market shares, making the total5
number of share observations 768.  The number of Progressive Grocer sales shares varied from zero
(for 13 GMAs) to four; the average shares estimated from the Guidebook was 4.9 percentage points.
The total coverage from both sources is shown in Table 4 below.  The Guidebook was also used to
classify the wholesale operators by type (retailer, cooperative wholesaler, voluntary wholesaler, and
proprietary wholesaler) and to estimate total national sales of the companies.  Total sales across
GMAs were compared with total national sales.
Market Definitions
The grocery marketing areas (GMAs) defined by SAMI were designed primarily on the basis
of the shipping patterns of grocery warehouses.  Wholesalers and retailers that managed grocery
warehouses (called “operators” or “participants” by SAMI) provided information on the location of
the warehouses and shipments to individual stores of all types of grocery products (frozen and
refrigerated foods, dry groceries, and health and beauty aids).  Some participants operated several
warehouses in a single GMA, and some participants supplied stores in the GMA from warehouses
outside the GMA.
It is clear from the confidential “Participant Information Guides” maintained by SAMI analysts
that GMAs were delineated so as to minimize the extent of “leakage” while at the same time
increasing the number of GMAs for sale to clients.  SAMI revenue was positively related to the
number of well defined GMAs for which reliable brand market shares could be calculated.  Regional
manufacturers could purchase information for just their selling areas or potential expansion areas and
national manufacturers would pay more as the number of useful GMAs rose.  However, because it
relied on wholesale shipping information, SAMI could not increase the number of GMAs indefinitely
or even match the number of Statistical Metropolitan Areas (SMAs) in the United States.  As the
number of GMAs increased, the extent of cross-GMA grocery shipments also increased, which
greatly complicated the calculation of accurate GMA market shares.  Therefore, the SAMI GMAs
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represent a compromise between providing fine geographic detail and aggregation to minimize
leakage across GMA boundaries.  Maps of the 54 GMAs are shown in Appendix B.
Historically, SAMI first began selling GMA data on three large metropolitan areas in the
Midwest and Houston, Texas (Table 1).  Within four months five more large cities had been added
to SAMI’s offerings, including New York and Boston.  During 1967, SAMI added nine more large
cities, some of them located in the South and far West.  By the end of 1968, SAMI offered local
grocery information on 25 of the largest U.S. cities that accounted for about 70 percent of U.S.
grocery sales.
These first 25 GMAs were fairly straight-forward choices, partly because their sizes gave
SAMI a very large share of total U.S. grocery sales and partly because they were geographically
cohesive.  The early SMAs had a high degree of coverage by SAMI participants and a low degree
of leakage from outside the GMA boundaries.  For example, 97 percent coverage of the Minneapolis
GMA was obtained from warehouse-withdrawals supplied by merely six SAMI participants;
moreover, of that 97 percent sample, at most 0.3 percentage points consisted of shipments into
Minneapolis from warehouses outside the GMA.  Most of the other early SAMI markets also attained
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high levels of coverage and low degrees of import leakages: Detroit, Milwaukee, Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Buffalo, Atlanta, Chicago, Seattle, Denver, and Phoenix are examples.  Each of these6
cities tend to be economically dominant metropolitan areas with few other large cities within a 100
mile radius.  A couple of exceptions are worth noting.  The Baltimore/Washington GMA had less
than 60 percent coverage, but it is apparent from the SAMI participant guides that the main reason
was SAMI’s failure to sign up the area’s leading retail operator, Giant Foods.  Had SAMI been able
to obtain Giant’s warehouse of shipments’ data, its coverage would have approached 90 percent.  The
Indianapolis case if different.  Indianapolis lies 160 miles from Chicago, 122 from Fort Wayne, 114
from Cincinnati, 97 from Louisville, and 242 from St. Louis.  Each of these surrounding cities have
large grocery warehouse operators.  SAMI was able to secure the participation of the four largest
operators within the Indianapolis market and the cooperation of several major operators that imported
groceries into the Indianapolis market from warehouses in Fort Wayne; Chicago; Desloge, Missouri;
Evansville, Indiana; Lima, Ohio; and two other locations outside the GMA.  Despite the large
coverage of inside operators (almost 90 percent) and eight outside warehouses, SAMI coverage of
retail sales in Indianapolis was less than 75 percent in 1990 because several operators in Michigan,
Illinois, and Ohio were not part of the SAMI system.  Although the Indianapolis case is exceptional
among the SAMI markets, it demonstrates the difficulty that SAMI had in trying to expand
geographical coverage in more densely populated areas of the United States.
With 25 markets accumulated in three years, creation of additional market areas proceeded
much more slowly after 1968.  From 1969 to 1973 only five more markets were added to SAMI’s
list.  Some were relatively easy choices: The Cincinnati market covered most of central and southern
Ohio (though how far south the border should be drawn may be arbitrary).  The Birmingham and
northern Florida markets also appear to be well defined.  However, the Memphis/Little Rock market
definition must have required some close decisions about whether to include Springfield, Missouri
or Jackson, Mississippi (both were excluded).
From 1974 to 1985, SAMI added three markets each year (except 1975 and 1978-1980).
Again, many of these markets appear to be well defined because they contain dominant metropolitan
areas relatively isolated from other competing metropolitan centers of commerce.  San Antonio, Salt
Lake City, Spokane, and Wichita markets fit this description.  Other markets covered entire states
or major portions of states separated by natural geographic barriers: the Norfolk/Richmond market
covered most of Virginia except the Washington area.  The Oklahoma City, Nashville, and Louisville
markets are similarly coextensive with state boundaries; Spokane covers Washington State east of
the Cascade Mountains.  The SAMI markets added in the late 1970s and early 1980s considerably
expanded the coverage of the South and many rural areas, yet even by 1985 many gaps remained in
SAMI’s geographical coverage.  The gaps include most of Appalachia, the Ozarks, south Georgia
and the Florida panhandle, Nevada and a huge area of the northern High Plains (Appendix B).  SAMI
apparently decided that its clients were relatively uninterested in areas dominated by low income
households or undergoing depopulation.
Some of the GMAs added by SAMI during the early 1980s appear to be somewhat arbitrarily
delineated, but one must bear in mind the excellent shipping data that SAMI analysts had from their
participating operators.  Amon the problematic market areas are Portland, Maine (may be part of
Boston); Scranton, Pennsylvania (part of Baltimore); Peoria, Illinois (part of St. Louis); Quad Cities
(part of Chicago to the east or Omaha/Des Moines to the west); and perhaps Shreveport/Jackson
(could be part of the Memphis or Dallas GMAs). 7
The 54 GMAs delineated by SAMI during 1985-1990 tend to correspond closely to other
commercial grocery data services.  Progressive Grocer’s Marketing Guidebook divided the entire
continental United States into 51 GMAs in 1990.  The Marketing Guidebook has been published
annually for about 30 years.  Like SAMI, the Guidebook is aimed at the salespeople and marketing
planners of grocery manufacturers who want to identify the major buyers of grocery products in each
region.  The major distributors with facilities in each GMA are identified according to their share of
GAM retail sales; moreover, like SAMI, the Guidebook also identifies out-of-market distribution
centers.  While Progressive Grocer does obtain some proprietary data from distributors (size and
location of warehouses, number of trucks, number and types of stores served), it does not have
regular access to shipping destinations.  (The state locations of stores is sometimes available, but not
all distributors reveal even this much).  The Guidebook GMAs tend to follow state lines wherever
possible.
There is a fairly close correspondence between the geographic definition of the SAMI and
Progressive Grocer GMAs (Table 2).  In general, where they overlap the SAMI markets are
contained within the Progressive Grocer markets.  Of the 54 SAMI markets, 35 are virtually
coextensive with Progressive Grocer markets.  In addition, eight Progressive Grocer markets
essentially were split in two by 16 SAMI markets (the former are Boston, Baltimore, Milwaukee,
Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis, Charlotte, and Columbia).  Only three SAMI markets (Jacksonville,
San Francisco, and Omaha) were split by six Progressive Grocer GMAs.  Finally, three Progressive
Grocer markets have no correspondence to SAMI markets; the three (Billings, Fargo and Springfield,
Missouri) fall in the empty intermarket areas between SAMI markets.  Therefore, in summary, with
three exceptions, all the other 51 SAMI markets are encompassed by 42 Progressive Grocer markets;
three SAMI markets correspond to three pairs of Progressive Grocer Markets.
The SAMI GMAs also correspond quite closely to the retail grocery markets defined by the
A.C. Nielsen company (Table 2).  The Nielsen markets were apparently designed from retail sales
information and consideration of Areas of Dominant Influence (ADIs).  Again there is a close
correspondence between the SAMI and Nielsen markets.  Nielsen splits the SAMI Cincinnati market
into a Columbus and Cincinnati portion; SAMI’s Omaha market is likewise split east from west; and
the SAMI Jacksonville market is divided into three Nielsen markets (Jacksonville, Orlando, and
Tampa).  There are four more such examples of SAMI markets split by Nielsen.  The most interesting
case is SAMI’s Quad Cities market, which Nielsen places in its large Omaha - Des Moines area, but
Progressive Grocer judges its part of the Chicago GMA.  
To summarize, the geographic definitions of GMAs by SAMI, Nielsen, and Progressive
Grocer are quite similar.  The SAMI areas are delineated to minimize “exports” from and “imports”
into each GMA, a market concept that comports with economists’ concepts of a market.  The SAMI
approach allows for large intermarket areas, whereas Progressive Grocer places every U.S. county
into one GMA.  In general, the Progressive Grocer GMAs are equal to or larger than SAMI’s,
whereas Nielsen’s are smaller or the same in size.  The overall impression is of great geographical
similarity of U.S. grocery-products markets.  Retail sales in the 54 GMAs in 1990 accounted for 75.4
percent of total U.S. grocery sales (Table 1).8
Ownership Types
Warehouse operators fall into two major classes: retail grocery chains buying for their own
stores and merchant wholesalers.  There are a few integrated retailers that sell wholesale to other
retailers in their markets or slightly outside them, and likewise a few wholesalers own and operate
some grocery stores, but his classification is almost always clear-cut.  Among the merchant
wholesalers, there are three forms of ownership.  Cooperative wholesalers are actually owned by the
small chains and independent retailers that they serve.  Voluntary wholesalers are not owned by the
retailers they serve, but the retailers are contractually affiliated for long periods of time with these
wholesalers, usually by contract.  Both cooperative and voluntary wholesalers typically operate
general-line warehouses.  The remaining merchant wholesalers are a miscellaneous group, containing
both general line and specialty wholesalers.  Many of these wholesalers are rack jobbers (tobacco,
candy, and magazines), HBA specialists, or other food specialists.  Table 3 shows the breakdown of
grocery warehouse operators by ownership type for the 54 SAMI market areas.  Integrated retailers
account for as little as 0.1 percent of GMA sales (Minneapolis) or as much as 84 percent (Denver).
Except for Michigan (where Spartan and Meijers are strong) and Chicago, the Midwest generally
displays low retailer shares.  Most GMAs south of the Midwest also share this characteristic.  Most
Atlantic coastal GMAs display a marked prediction for retailer integration.
Cooperative wholesalers are important players in only a few GMAs.  In the Northeast,
southern New England, eastern New York state, and eastern Pennsylvania stand out.  In the Midwest,
cooperative activity is centered in Chicago and Milwaukee (where Roundy’s has a leading position)
and in the states of Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri.  In the South, significant penetration of
cooperatives is found only around Memphis and northern Texas.  Three large cooperative wholesalers
operate in Salt Lake City (Associated Foods), Seattle (Associated Grocers), and Los Angeles
(Certified).  Very few GMAs have more than one cooperative grocery wholesaler.
Voluntary wholesalers also have uneven distribution across the United States.  They dominate
grocery wholesaling Pittsburgh, parts of Ohio, Minnesota, northern Wisconsin, and a couple of
GMAs in Texas and Oklahoma.  However, in most GMAs, voluntary wholesalers have the greatest
share among the merchant wholesalers in practically all of the GMAs.
About 5 percent of wholesale grocery activity in the typical GMA cannot be classified by type.
This “unknown” category includes retailers and wholesalers too small to be listed in Progressive
Grocer’s guidebook.  It also includes many merchant wholesalers specialized in fresh produce, meat,
poultry, and seafood.  SAMI was not interested in collecting data on these types of merchant
wholesalers because the majority of such products are not branded by manufacturers.
Integrated Retailers
Grocery chain retailers that have large enough retail operations in a grocery marketing area
(GMA) typically are heavily invested in grocery warehouse assets.  Backward vertical integration by
retailers is motivated by both the prospects of greater operational efficiency and for strategic reasons.
Exclusive retailer ownership of warehouses resolves several differences that may arise between a
retailer and an independent wholesaler.  The most profitable business decisions for the wholesaler
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may result in suboptimal profits for the retailer (and vise versa).  Generally speaking, retailers would9
desire more frequent deliveries to stores than is optimal for the wholesaler to provide; more frequent
replenishment of store shelves would permit retailers to increase the number of items stocked in the
stores (multiple facings of popular items can be reduced) and reduce the risk of outages.  Retailers
might prefer more deliveries at night or in the early morning hours for the convenience of its
customers, but wholesalers might find such a shift would be a difficult challenge in labor relations.
Retailers would like wholesalers to stock a mix of items that precisely matches their customers’
preferred groceries, but wholesalers must balance the needs of several retail clients with differing
customer bases.  When new warehouse facilities or significant expansions are being planned, a retail
client would like the investment to occur close to the economic centroid of its own retail operations,
but an independent wholesaler will expand in a direction and a pace that fits best its expectation of
the future locations of all its likely retail clients.  Another investment decisions involves integrated
electronic inventory-ordering systems; a system adopted by a wholesaler may not have the technical
features that are ideal for each of its retail customers.  Once adopted, such computerized systems may
be incompatible with the systems adopted by alternative supplies, thus reducing the bargaining power
of the retail client.  Most large wholesalers offer private label products, but the label is controlled by
the wholesalers.  That is, the quality of the products is largely a wholesaler decision.  More
importantly, unlike the store brands of the largest retailers, the controlled brands cannot be offered
exclusively to just one retail client.  Finally, warehouse ownership by retailers may be a tool for
horizontal rivalry among retailers in a GMA.  Investment in a large, dedicated warehouse facility
represents a concrete, highly visible symbol of commitment to a market.  Part of the investment costs
are sunk costs that cannot be recovered should the owner exit the GAM.  Moreover, a retailer may
intentionally build “ahead of demand;” that is, a warehouse might contain excess capacity.  Both sunk
costs and excess capacity can discourage potential entrants from moving into a GMA or can serve
to discipline an existing weak rival into a less aggressive pricing stance.  In brief, direct warehouse
ownership can solidify the market shares of integrated retailers.
Appendix Table 1 contains a list of the 121 grocery retailers known to have 1992 U.S. sales
of at least $250 million.  Sales are estimated by Progressive Grocer in some cases; a few companies
above this size limit may be missing, but the list is reasonably complete.  These 121 companies were
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listed irrespective of the extent of their wholesale integration.  One operator of “supercenters” or
department stores, Wal-Mart, is also included.  A few wholesalers with extensive retail operations
are listed as well, e.g., Penn Traffic, Super Valu, and Holiday Companies.  Only the retail grocery
divisions of these diversified companies are included.
Nearly all of the top ten grocery chains were fully integrated in general-line grocery products
in 1990.  There are few exceptions.  Kroger owns the Fry’s chain based in Phoenix: Fry’s operates
a 1,000,000 square foot warehouse complex in Phoenix that supplies stores in Arizona that have retail
sales there of more than $1 billion.  However, Fry’s has made a foray into the San Francisco GMA,
where it had a 2 percent local market share.  Because its San Francisco sales are not large enough to
justify building a warehouse in northern California, Fry’s is supplied by the huge cooperative
wholesaler, Certified Grocers of Los Angeles.  This appears to be exceptional, as Kroger’s other
operations appear to be fully integrated.  Another exception to the general rules appears in the
wholesaling of frozen foods, HBAs, and housewares.  Some large frozen food specialty wholesalers
supply major chains: Burris supplies Giant in Washington, DC and Southeast Frozen supplies Grand
Union in Atlanta.  HBAs are sometimes supplied by specialized wholesalers, like Rawson Drug on
the West Coast, but most of the leading retailers appear to have special warehouses for HBAs that10
deliver to large sections of the country.  A&P delivers HBAs and housewares from New Jersey HBA
warehouse all the way to New Orleans and Atlanta.
Leading U.S. retailers have substantial investments in warehouses, truck, and trailers., The
nine largest companies own facilities that aggregate to at least 3.5 million square feet of space.
Kroger, the largest U.S. grocery retailer in 1990, operated at least 24 grocery warehouses with nearly
10 million square feet of storage space.  These data may actually undercount warehouse space
because Kroger, Safeway, A&P, Winn-Dixie, and some others are reluctant to reveal warehouse sized
(but not locations) to Progressive Grocer; this report estimates the sizes of these warehouses from
other information.  Retailers below this top group are not nearly so shy about revealing warehouse
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sizes, and nearly all the merchant wholesalers are candid about their buildings.  Altogether there were
26 U.S. grocery retailers that owned at least 1 million square feet of warehouse space.  Southland
Corporation, operator of the largest U.S. convenience store chain (7-Eleven), owns six warehouses
that span the Continent, but these warehouses supply only HBA items to their stores.
The size of warehouses owned is closely correlated with the number of stores served,
especially when the number of stores is converted to a conventional-supermarket-equivalence figure
(Appendix Table 1).  Some integrated retailers own as little as 1500 square feet of warehouse space
for each supermarket-equivalent (e.g., American Stores) and some as much as 5000 square feet (Food
Lion), but 2000 or 3000 is more typical.
With a couple of exceptions, the top 50 retailers are fully integrated into grocery
wholesaling.  By “full integration” is meant sole ownership of warehouses for produce, other
10
refrigerated foods, and all other groceries except perhaps frozen foods, housewares, HBA items, and
candy-magazine racks.
Retailers with 1990 sales of $400 million but below $1 billion present a more mixed picture
(see Retailers No. 53 to 97).  Slightly less than half of this middle-sized group are fully integrated,
about one-fourth are partially integrated, and the remaining one-third are unintegrated.  By “partial”
or “tapered” integration is meant ownership of substantial warehouse capacity (at least 100,000 ft. )
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together with purchases of groceries from merchant wholesalers.  In fact, only 19 of the 121 largest
retailers report partial integration, with this arrangement most common among firms with $600 to
$800 million in retail sales and 100 to 200 supermarket-equivalents.  Virtually all of the tapered-
integration cases involve single GMAs with large dollar sales or geographic spread (NYC, San
Francisco, El Paso, and Phoenix).  Convenience store chains tend to engage in tapered integration.
The largest cases of nonintegrated retailers occur in New York City, a GMA well supplied
with merchant wholesalers.  There are five nonintegrated retailers with sales of $500 to $700 million,
but they operate only 16 to 27 stores (or 26 to 79 supermarket-equivalents) and have market shares
of less than 3 percent of the New York GMA.  In other cities, the largest nonintegrated retailers have
from 16 to 44 stores (40 to 80 supermarket equivalents) and less than a 3 percent share.  When
retailers generated less than $400 million in sales or operated fewer than 30 stores (40 supermarket-
equivalents), they appeared to be nearly always nonintegrated.  A dozen exceptions to this rule are
listed at the bottom of Appendix Table 1.  Some of these small integrated retailers may be
misclassified; they may be wholesalers with minor interests in retailing.11
To summarize, there are three types of vertical integration by grocery retailers.  Full backward
integration into grocery wholesaling is characteristic of nearly all retailers with 1990 retails sales of
at least $1 billion and the preferred option for retailers with at least $500 million in sales and more
than 30 supermarkets.  Very few retailers with sales of less than $400 million or fewer than 40
supermarkets own or operate significant grocery warehouses (those with 100,000 square feet of space
or more).  Tapered integration is a relatively unusual strategy followed by large convenience-store
11
chains and supermarket chains with sales of $400 to $800 million in sales.
Merchant Wholesalers
General-line grocery merchant wholesalers deliver a broad range of grocery products to
retailers that are too small to operate profitably their own warehouse. That is, merchants wholesalers’
clients are typically small grocery chains that operate less than 30 or 40 supermarkets or nonchain
grocers.  When one client becomes so large that it can efficiently become integrated, the loss of that
business can be financially painful.  An example of such an event was Albertson’s decision to drop
Super Food Services as its supplier in 1994.  Albertson’s operated 75 large supermarkets in the
Tampa area in 1993 and had been adding about two new stores per year in the early 1990s.
Albertson’s purchased and remodeled a large warehouse near Tampa for its own use, thereby causing
Super Food Services to lose one-third of its revenues.  Therefore, there are sound business reasons
for merchant wholesalers to attempt to diversify their client base by acquiring a large number of small
and medium-sized accounts.
Appendix Table 3 contains a reasonably complete list of the 64 largest U.S. merchant
wholesalers in 1990-1992.  Each firm had annual sales of at least $200 million at wholesale
(corresponding to $250 to $500 million in retail grocery sales).  Each company operates one or more
grocery warehouses containing at least 300,000 square feet of storage space.
The big four wholesalers operate extensive, multi-regional warehouse networks with total
capacities of from 6 to 13 million square feet.  Super Valu’s warehouses are the largest on average
(about 550,000 square feet), and its newest facilities are being built at around 800 to 900,000 square
feet.  Scrivner operates the smallest warehouses (about 300,000 square feet on average), and Fleming
is not far behind (about 400,000).  Nash Finch operates very small facilities in four regions, but all
other merchant wholesalers own and operate five or fewer warehouses that deliver in cohesive areas
comprising a few states.  Wakefern, for example, operates four New York City warehouses that serve
only New York and three adjacent GMAs.  Penn Traffic Co. is pretty much confined to parts of three
states (NY,PA, OH).  From its strong base in Los Angeles, Certified Grocers ships only a minor
portion of its groceries to parts of the San Francisco GMA.  In fact, only ten U.S. wholesalers have
significant shares (say 2 percent or more) of at least four of the 54 GMAs.  All others supply less than
four GMAs.
Other Wholesalers
There are two curious listings int he SAMI Participant Guides.  First, in 23 SMAs an
obviously generic category entitled “mass merchandisers” (company no. 0149) is listed.  This term
normally refers to discount department stores such as Wal Mart and K Mart, both of which have
significant food and nonfood grocery sales.  Total retail sales of these mass merchandisers was $78912
million (an average of $34 million per GMA) or approximately 0.2 percent of total U.S. grocery store
sales.  In the 23 GMAs into which the mass merchandisers’ warehouses shipped, they accrued an
average market share of 1.2 percent; the range was from 0.1 percent to 4.4 percent.  The GMAs with
significant mass merchandiser presence most highly concentrated in Missouris and all adjacent states
except Illinois; specifically, the mass merchandisers’ shares are 2 percent or higher in the St. Louis,
Kansas City, Whicita, and Shreveport/Jackson GMAs.  Surrounding this core area is a ring with a
secondary concentration of mass-merchandiser presence; the ring loops mainly to the southeast and
southwest of Missouri.  There are nine GMAs with 1 to 2 percent market shares for mass
merchandisers: Nashville/Knoxville and three GMAs to the south; Omaha/Des Moines, Oklahoma
City, and three GMAs in Texas.  This geographic pattern is consistent with the retail sales pattern of
Wal Mart around 1990.
The second puzzling SAMI listing is a likewise generic entry “General merchandise
distributors” (no. 0129), some with further descriptors such as “eastern division,” “mid-American
division,” “southern division,” and “western division.”  The 13 GMAs with such a listing had average
sales of $39 million and average market shares of 0.8 percent.  These distributors sold only HBA
items.  Interviews with former SAMI analysts revealed that SAMI tried to take into account the
activities of “diverters,” wholesalers engaged in long-distance geographic arbitrage.  These entries
probably represent known sales activities of major diverters.
Sales Concentration
The degree of sales concentration in a given grocery marketing area (GMA) is of interest
primarily to two types of businesses - food manufacturers and grocery retailers. IN order to enter a
new geographic market, a food processor must approach the buying committee of a grocery
warehouse operation and obtain a favorable decision from the committee in order to have the product
added to the warehouse’s inventory.  If the product is adopted by a wholesaler, chances are that
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some or all of the wholesaler’s clients will place the product on their retail shelves.  If the product’s
sales are satisfactory, other retailers and wholesalers will demand the product as well, thus boosting
the product’s market share in the GMA.  But convincing a buying committee is no easy matter unless
the manufacturer has a sterling track record with new product introductions or is prepared to unleash
a significant advertising or promotion campaign.  Grocery warehouses can be very large (in excess
of one million square feet of floor space), but even the largest carry only a limited number of items.
If wholesaler concentration in a GMA is high, a food company’s broker or sales representative has
relatively few opportunities to make a sale.
Grocery retailers contemplating entry into a given GMA also are concerned about the degree
of wholesaler concentration.  Only the largest retailers can afford to build a new grocery warehouse
and the 30 or more stores that would be served by the warehouse.  Shipping warehoused products
from an adjacent GMA where the company already many have a wholesale facility will typically entail
transportation costs or delays that will place the entrant at a cost disadvantage relative to established
retailers in the target GMA.  Thus, a would-be entrant must utilize existing warehouse facilities in the
target GMA, at least until the retailer has built enough stores to make vertical integration efficient.
Existing warehouse facilities operated by merchant wholesalers are the primary choice set because
integrated retailers are unlikely to want to assist a new rival in becoming cost competitive in the
GMA.  Another group of retailers also has an interest in wholesaler concentration: existing retailers13
too small to vertically integrate into full scale wholesaling operations.  Many small grocery chains
own small warehouses (less than 50,000 square feet or so), but these facilities cannot carry the 15,
000 or more items stocked in modern supermarkets.  Thus, a GMA with only five or six merchant
wholesalers from the point of view of nonintegrated retailers.
Because wholesaler concentration affects the entry conditions of food manufacturers and
potential large-scale retailer entrants and affects the bargain position of established retailers, grocery
wholesaler concentration is a public policy issue as well.  One purpose of the antitrust laws is to
preserve a workable level of competition in well delineated markets.  Horizontal mergers in the
grocery wholesaling industry were common in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and these mergers may
have resulted in levels of sales concentration at the appropriate local geographic level that increased
the potential for unilateral or multilateral market power.  The concentration data that follow can shed
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some light on this critical public policy issue.
Warehouse Numbers
Appendix Table 1 lists the number and size of grocery warehouses located within each GMA
by type of owner: integrated retailer or merchant wholesaler.  The location and size of warehouses
run by specialty wholesalers is generally not known, so in this case the number of specialized
wholesalers in the sample that are shipping to the GMA is given; their size is in dollars of retail sales,
not square footage.  These data on specialized wholesalers are far from complete, whereas data on
the other two types generally comprise a very large share of total sales.  The number of specialized
wholesalers’ warehouses contains a good deal of double counting, but there is not double counting
of the other warehouses.  In any case, the number of warehouses shown is at best a minimum: only
the warehouses of companies with at least 2 percent of sales in each GMA are known to be in the
sample; in some cases these companies publically report only their square footage; or they report
operating several warehouses in one location when the warehouses are in fact housed under one roof
or grouped together in one warehouse complex.  In short, floor space is a superior indicator of
warehouse capacity in a GMA.
The United States has at least 40,000 grocery warehouses, but in the SAMI sample, the 54
GMAs contain at least 600 general-line grocery warehouses (Appendix Table 1).  This total does not
count most of the retailer-owned warehouses that specialize in HBAs or housewares, general-line
warehouses located outside the GMAs (Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, most of the northern High Plains,
central Pennsylvania, and other extra-GMA areas), nor grocery warehouses operated by food
manufacturers or specialty wholesalers.  Despite these omissions, the 600 warehouses handled at least
90 percent of the storable grocery products delivered to the 54 GMAs’ grocery stores in 1990-1992,
or about 68 percent of total national shipments.
Assuming that the sample covers about 80 percent of capacity, U.S. integrated retailers
operated general-line grocery warehouses with a total of 150 million square feet of storage capacity,
and merchant wholesalers about 125 million square feet, for a U.S. total of almost 275 million square
feet.  Across the GMAs, sample general-line warehouse capacity varies from 11 million square feet
in New York City to zero in the Quad Cities on the Iowa-Illinois border.  That is, the Quad Cities
GMA is supplied almost entirely by facilities located in the surrounding GMAs (Des Moines, Chicago,
St. Louis, and Minneapolis), further evidence that this GMA may be poorly defined.  The Charleston,14
WV GMA has only three significant warehouses located within or on the edge of its borders, so it
is another dubiously defined GMA.  Peoria is a third GMA supplied mainly by imported groceries.
Warehouse space in a GMA is closely related to the sales size of the market, but the
correlation is not perfect (cf., Table 1 and Appendix Table 1).  New York City has $24 billion in retail
grocery sales, of which approximately $19.5 billion comes from stores served by SAMI participants
(those located within the GMA and a few located outside).  Stores in NYC served by participants
generated about $1,400 per year for each square foot of general-line warehouse space; if one discards
warehouses outside the GMA, the sales/ft.  rises to $1,930.  If, as is likely the case, shipments into
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the GMA are about the same size as exports from warehouses inside the GMA, the latter figure is
more accurate.  Retail sales associated with general-line warehouses in Los Angeles amount to
$2,400/ft. , but the comparable figure for San Francisco is only $1,500.  San Francisco’s warehouses
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export considerable merchandise to Nevada, Northern California, and other areas outside the SAMI
GMA.  Chicago is even lower at $1,130 per square foot.  Denver, a relatively export-oriented GMA,
generates $1,500/ft.  For import-oriented Charleston, WV the figure is $1,900/ft.
2 2
The average amount of retail sales across the United States in 1990 was approximately $1,660
per square feet of warehouse space.  Variation across markets can be explained by the extent of net
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exports from the GMA and by various efficiency factors (warehouse turnover and utilization, grocery
store density, and transportation network efficiency).  In export-oriented GMAs like San Francisco
and Chicago, GMA sales understate the true retail sales of served stores (and vice versa for net
import GMAs like Charleston, WV).  Efficiency factors can be revealed by examining store sales
across warehouses within self-contained GMAs or groups of GMAs.  A casual examination of six
such groupings reveals that leading integrated retailers generally have the highest wholesale efficiency
(high sales per square foot).  In Los Angeles, for example, Lucky’s and Von’s both generate more
than $3,000 of retail sales per square foot of warehouse space; H.E. Butt leads in San Antonio as do
Albertson’s and Smith’s in Salt Lake City.  In most regions, leading voluntary wholesalers attain sales
per square feet of $1,200 to $1,500, but in some markets such as San Antonio, the figure drops to
the $800 range.  Lower ranking voluntary merchants drop to as low as $300 in sales.  Cooperative
wholesalers can be quite efficient (Associated in Seattle, Certified in Los Angeles, and Associated in
Florida), but as a group rank third in their markets.  The fact that merchant wholesaler generally serve
a smaller average store mix than leading chains probably explains much of the disparity in sales
efficiency.
Company Numbers
One measure of market sales concentration is the number of sellers of a given product or
service.  While there are thousands of grocery wholesalers in business in the United States, non carry
on their activities in all parts of the United States.  According to the SAMI data base, the largest
merchant wholesaler in the United States is Fleming with 1990 wholesale sales of about $12.5 billion.
Yet, this grocery wholesaler operates in only 28 of the 54 SAMI GMAs.  The second largest, Super
Valu ($11 billion sales) covers 25 GMAs, of which only 13 overlap with Fleming.  Likewise,
American Stores, the nation’s largest grocery retailer ($22 billion in retail sales) has significant sales
in only 15 of the 54 SAMI market areas.  The second largest retailer, Kroger ($19 billion) has
significant grocery warehouse shipments to 23 GMAs but meets in only two of them (Peoria and15
Dallas) with American Stores.  These facts reinforce the necessity of examining concentration at the
local market level.
Table 4 contains 1990 sample data on the number of warehouses and companies operating
warehouses in each of the 54 SAMI markets.  The coverage of the sample is shown in the last column
of the table.  On average, sample coverage (measured by the retail grocery sales of the stores served
by the warehouses) is quite high.  Of the 54 markets, 27 of them (50 percent) have coverage of at
least 90 percent, and 44 GMAs (81 percent) have at least 80 percent sample coverage.  Almost all
of the data are derived from confidential SAMI worksheets, but supplementary data on
nonparticipants is taken from Progressive Grocer (1991) and adjusted to SAMI market definitions.
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Very few leading merchant wholesalers or integrated retailers are omitted from the sample.  Except
for the few GMAs with low average, it is highly unlikely that any company with a 2 percent market
share or more is omitted from the sample.  Total U.S. and GMA company sales data were used as
a cross-check on the SAMI market sales data.
The total number of grocery warehouses varies considerably across markets.  New York has
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by far the largest number of warehouses (42); in 1990, the average sample warehouse shipped
groceries worth $464 million at retail.  By contrast, the Greenville/Spartanburg/Ashland market gets
by with only six warehouses covering 87 percent of this South Carolina market; the average
warehouse shipped goods with a $280 million retail sales value.  In general, it is the largest
metropolitan areas that have the most grocery warehouses: Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland,
Baltimore/Washington, New Orleans, and San Francisco each have at least 20 large warehouses.
However, some very large cities have few grocery depots: Minneapolis has only seven, Miami only
11, Denver only 9, and Houston only 13.
Many of the sample warehouses supply products to all five major grocery department: dry
groceries (food and nonfood), meat, other refrigerated foods, frozen foods, and health and beauty
aids (HBAs).  In Boston, for example, eight of the establishments are “full-service” warehouses; a
couple sell everything except meat or frozen foods; seven do not sell HBAs, whereas four warehouses
handle HBA products exclusively.  There are scattered examples of warehouses that ship only meat
or only frozen foods, but these are exceptional cases.  Almost every GMA contains a few warehouses
selling only HBAs, and these HBA warehouses are typically located outside the GMA.  That is,
because HBA products are relatively expensive compared to shipping costs, HBA suppliers typically
ship greater distances than foods and other groceries.  In short it is difficult to generalize about the
mix of products a given warehouse will stock, but only a minority of them are “full-service” (five
department) types.  The most common product mix is dry groceries combined with two or three other
food departments.
In any case, a retailer trying to locate a supplier of products for only one department (e.g.,
just frozen foods) will typically be able to secure supplies from nine or ten warehouses, not from the
15 or 20 warehouses of all kinds.  Moreover, in most GMAs there are companies that operate
multiple warehouses, so the choices among wholesale companies is more restricted than the number
of warehouses would imply.  For example, Grand Union is a retailer that supplies the New York
GMA with about 5 percent of its retail groceries.  However, Grand Union’s stores receive their
products from no less than five warehouses scattered around the metropolitan area, each with a
unique product mix.  This is an extreme but not unusual example that is found in other GMAs and16
among smaller wholesalers.  Market Wholesale Company, with only $350 million in annual sales,
ships into the San Francisco GMA from four warehouses in three different cities.
The sixth and seventh columns of Table 4 count the number of sample wholesale companies
supplying a GMA in 1990.  The 42 warehouses in New York are owned by just 20 companies, of
which seven are integrated retailers and 13 are merchant wholesalers.  For most GMAs, the number
of independent merchant wholesalers is in the range of three to six (but some of these sell HBAs
exclusively).  The huge Los Angeles/San Diego GMA is extreme case because there are only two
merchant wholesale companies of any size: one very small HBA supplier and one cooperative offering
a full spectrum of groceries to about 16 percent of the retail grocery market.  The rest of the market
(accounting for 70 percent of retail sales) is tied up by integrated retailers.  The remaining 14 percent
of the Los Angeles market is supplied by non-sample wholesalers too small to be separately identified.
Sales Concentration Ratios
Market shares can be used to identify markets with dominant firms or groups of leading firms
that are so large that noncompetitive pricing or output conduct can become feasible.  Table 5 shows
the market shares of the four leading wholesale grocery operators in the 54 SAMI markets.  In
addition, for all companies in the sample a truncated Hirfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) is calculated.
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The number of companies and sample size is shown in Table 4.  Because the sample coverage is so
large, omitted companies have small shares unlikely to affect the calculation of the HHI.  In the first
five columns both integrated retailers and merchant wholesalers are mixed together; the last two
columns take into account concentration among merchant wholesalers only.
The market share of the leading firm tends to cluster around 30 percent in most GMAs.
However, in seven GMAs the market share of the leading firm is greater than 40 percent, a level often
believed to offer scope for dominant-firm behavior.  The seven GMAs are Portland, Maine
(Hannaford Bros.); Grand Rapids (Spartan); Minneapolis (Super Valu); Wichita (Kroger); Houston
(Grocer Supply Co.);San Antonio (H.E. Butt); and Denver (Kroger).  Five of the seven market
leaders are retailers.
New York, Boston, Cleveland, Dallas, and three adjacent GMAs in the deep south have the
smallest leading-firm shares.  Two of the three southern GMAs (Memphis/Little Rock and
Shreveport/Jackson) are somewhat problematic cases.  Other industry sources suggest that the two
should be combined or that certain borderland cities (Shreveport, Springfield, Missouri) might be
placed elsewhere.  Similarly, there is disagreement about whether Mobile, Alabama should be part
of the New Orleans GMA or grouped with other Alabama cities.  There is not enough information
to settle these and other fine points concerning GMA limits.
In a few markets, there is a pattern of two leading firms with large shares followed by a third-
ranking firm with very small shares.  Portland (ME), Grand Rapids, Chicago, and Norfolk/Richmond
are examples.  Where both leaders are rivals, such a structure could encourage duopoly-type
behavior.
The four-firm concentration ratios (CR4s) for these GMAs are mostly quite high.  In many
industrial-products markets, empirical studies often infer that a CR4 of 60 percent or higher offers17
the leaders considerable opportunity for oligopolistic behavior, while a CR4 of 40 percent or less is
of little competitive concern.  Of the 54 GMAs, 44 are highly concentrated markets.  None of the
wholesale grocery markets have low concentration (CR4<40 percent), though New York and the
three deep south markets just discussed come close.  Concentration is especially high among the
South Atlantic states and those west of the Mississippi.  These areas are the GMAs that have
experienced the greatest population growth since the 1940s.  and that ten to be surrounded by areas
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of very low population density.  Why these characteristics might foster wholesaler concentration is
something of a puzzle.
The sixth column of Table 5 contains the sample firms’ HHI.  The HHI and CR4 are highly
correlated across the 54 GMAs ( r = + 0.89).  The critical levels of HHI used for merger enforcement
are 1000 and 1800, though these are to some extent arbitrary.  Only six GMAs have 1990 HHI levels
below 1000; three of these GMAs are the three problematic “Deep South” markets whose borders
may be drawn too generously.  New York again displays low concentration; Cleveland and
Indianapolis are borderline cases.  Perhaps the most striking fact is that 18 of the 54 GMAs already
exceed the dangerous 1800 level, and several others are quite close.  Again, most of the South
Atlantic and far west GMAs are relatively highly concentrated.
The final calculations of CR4 and HHI utilize only merchant wholesalers.  Two measures of
sales concentration among merchant wholesalers are presented in Table 5.  The CR4 is calculated on
the assumption that all wholesalers not in the sample are merchants and that none of the omitted firms
is in the top four.  Because integrated retailers are omitted also, the CR4 for merchants must be
greater than or equal to the CR4 for all warehouse operators.  In GMAs with few retailers in leading
positions, the two CR4s will be close (observe Minneapolis, for example), but generally the CR4 for
merchants is 5 to 10 percentage points higher.
The HHI for merchant wholesalers utilizes only information in the sample.  In 1990, every
GMA had an HHI in excess of 1000.  The lowest observed HHI is for New York City.  There are 12
merchant wholesalers in the sample, the largest being Wakefern with only about 12 percent of
wholesale grocery sales in the GMA.  Besides New York, only 12 other GMAs have HHI indexes
below 1800, the upper threshold level for merger investigations.  Several GMAs have very high HHI
ratios, generally signaling the presence of dominant wholesalers.  In Syracuse, a subsidiary of Penn
Traffic Co. dominates the merchant wholesaler segment with nearly two-thirds of the local market;
a Scrivner affiliate languishes in distant second place with one-fifth of the market.  But such
dominance is unusual in the Northeast, the Great Lakes States, and much of the South.  In
Minneapolis, Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Houston and most of the Far West (Mountain and
Pacific states) local domination of the merchant wholesaler segment is the rule.  In Minneapolis,
Super Value and Scrivner rule in a virtual duopoly, sharing more than four-fifths of the total
wholesale market.  Other examples of GMAs dominated in 1990 by merchant wholesalers include:
￿ Richfood controlled 63% of Norfolk/Richmond
￿ Harris-Teeter has 87% of merchant sales in Charlotte
￿ Merchants Distributors monopolizes Greenville, SC
￿ Super Valu is the sole major merchant in Atlanta
￿ Super Food Services has over half of Jacksonville
￿ Super Valu controls 70% of Denver’s small merchant segment18
￿ The Associated Foods Cooperative Monopolizes Salt Lake City
￿ Fleming is the only significant merchant in Phoenix
￿ Associated Grocers dominates merchants in Seattle
￿ Certified Grocers is nearly the only merchant in Los Angeles
Company Market Shares
The examples just given above reinforce a point made previously: even the largest integrated
retailers and merchant wholesalers are unevenly distributed across only portions of the United States.
The leading warehouse operators tend to have high market shares in one or a few GMAs, weaker
positions in a few adjacent markets, and vast stretches of the country with no presences.  Table 6
shows the estimated GMA shares for the ten largest grocery retailers in the United States, measured
in local retail grocery sales.  A few GMAs may be omitted where the company operates so few stores
that its share is less than 2 percent (and usually less than 1 percent) of the GMA.
American stores operates markets under many local brand names: Star in Boston, Acme in
Philadelphia, Jewel around Chicago, Alpha Beta in Texas, Buttrey in Spokane, and Lucky Foods in
California.  It is the first or second-ranking retailer in each of those metropolitan areas.  On average,
American Stores has a 10 percent share of the 13 GMAs shown in Table 6.  Safeway Stores has
higher average shares in four distinct area: Washington, D.C.; Denver; Phoenix; and all of the West
coast markets except Los Angeles.  Kroger is by far the most geographically diverse grocery retails
in the United States, with significant recorded shares in 23 GMAs.  Kroger operates in a huge band
across middle America from an eastern border that runs from Pittsburgh to Savannah to a westward
point in Colorado; except for Houston, Kroger has no presence in the Southwest or Pacific states.
The geographic spread of A & P is far more spotty; it owns leading supermarket chains in Detroit and
Milwaukee, but operates mixtures of supermarkets and small box stores in 11 other disconnected
GMAs.  Winn-Dixie operates in 15 GMAs from central Virginia down to Miami and around the Gulf
Coast states as far west as Dallas.  Food Lion overlaps Winn Dixie in seven GMAs in the South
Atlantic region.
All the remaining integrated chains operate in Cohesive, more restricted regions.  Albertson’s
is located in two Texas cities and in all nine GMAs in the far West.  Supermarkets General sells in
five Northeastern GMAs; Publix is restricted to Florida; and Von’s is found only in the Los Angeles
area.  Thus, only six or seven U.S. grocery chains operate outside more than one of the eight regions
shown in Table 6.  In fact, four of the GMAs are bereft of stores of any of the top ten chains.
The extent to which the leading chains have intra-market contracts is surprisingly low (Table
7).  Kroger and Safeway meet in only one GMA (Denver, where they share 70 percent of the market).
Moreover, Kroger has only one minor contact point with American Stores in the Peoria GMA.  Even
A & P has surprisingly little market overlap with the big three firms, and such contacts that exist
mostly involve A & P’s box-stores, which may not directly compete with the other firms’
supermarkets.  Winn-Dixie does have a large number of contact points with both Kroger (eight
overlaps) and Food Lion (sever), of which three are common to all three chains.  Avoidance of
contact points is a strategic option of diversified firms that is called forbearance (Mueller, Scott).19
Market shares of ten large merchant grocery wholesalers are shown in Table 8.  One or more
of the top four merchants operate in all but four of the 54 GMAs in the sample; two or more are
found in 31 of the 54 GMAs; and three or more overlap in nine of the 54 markets.  The largest
merchant (Fleming) ships groceries in or to 30 GMAs, slightly more than half of the sample. The six
wholesalers below the big four operate in an average of only five GMAs.  All of the wholesalers
below the top four have contiguous territories; indeed, the ninth largest (Certified Grocers) operates
in only one state (California).  The top four merchant wholesalers tolerate gaps int heir territories.
For example, Wetterau serves Massachusetts, northern New England, and Pennsylvania but has no
significant business in New York State.  Of the top four, Super Valu appears to have the strongest
local market positions with an average of 13 percent of the 25 GMAs in which it operates.  Scrivner,
Penn Traffic, Roundy’s, and Nosh-Finch control only 6 to 8 percent of their average GMA.
Table 9 calculates contact points for the top ten wholesalers.  Unlike the integrated retailers
in Table 7, the major wholesalers show little evidence of avoiding each others’ territories.  Fleming,
Super Valu, and Scrivner each overlap one of the others in a high proportion of the markets; triple
overlaps are quite uncommon, but pairs are not.  Penn Traffic, Roundy’s, and Nosh-Finch also tend
to meet one of the big three quite frequently.
Merger Analysis
Current federal horizontal merger-enforcement guidelines promise an investigation and
possible legal action if the level and increase in sales concentration in an appropriately defined market
are above certain limits (Department of Justice).  In brief, if a market’s Hèrfindahl-Hirshman Index
(HHI) of concentration reaches levels above 1800 after a merger and the increase in HHI is 100 or
more points, then the merging firms are told to expect a court challenge by the Department of Justice
or the Federal Trade Commission.  However, if the post-merger HHI reaches 1000 to 1800 points
or if the change in the HHI is between 50 and 100 points, then a more complex set of considerations
comes into play.  Further analysis of entry conditions, probable financial failure of one of the merger
partners, and likely efficiencies resulting from the merger must enter the mix of criteria to be applied
in the decision to challenge a specific merger.  In the case of many mergers, the antitrust agencies
apply the dubious “5 percent” rule.  Economic models are used to predict the price effects of the
merger.  If post-merger prices are predicted to rise by 5 percent or more, then the merging firms must
divest themselves of assets in the affected market areas.
Mergers 1992-1996
On October 29, 1992, Wetterau, Inc. became a wholly owned subsidiary of Super Valu
Stores, Inc., and the new entity was renamed SUPERVALU, Inc.   At the time the merger was
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proposed, Super Valu and Wetterau were the second-largest and fourth-largest grocery merchant
wholesalers in the United States.  IN 1992, the new combined firm, SUPERVALUE, became
approximately equal in sales size to Fleming Companies, the largest U.S. grocery wholesaler.  Both
leaders are more than twice the size of the third-ranking firm, Scrivner.  This section examines the
changes in GMA concentration that resulted from the merger.
Trade sources speculate that the 1992 Super Valu-Wetterau merger was the spark that
kindled numerous similar flares-up in the industry, including several merger negotiations and20
proposals that were not consummated.  That is, several wholesalers and integrated retailers merged
or attempted to merge as defensive moves in response to Super Valu’s aggressive expansions,
including another large acquisition in 1994 of Sweet Life Foods.  Sweet Life, a voluntary merchant
wholesaler headquartered in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, had 1990-192 sales of $1 billion spread
over three Northeastern GMAs (Albany, Hartford, and Boston).  With an average market share of
9 percent and warehouse capacity of 1.36 million square feet, Sweet Life was probably the leading
merchant wholesaler in the three markets at the time (C&S was about equal in 1990 but probably
surpassed Sweet Life by 1994).  SUPERVALU closed one of Sweet Life’s warehouses in
Massachusetts, laying off 450 workers.  This acquisition allowed Super Valu to expand quickly to
the Northeast; except for Pittsburgh, Super Valu had previously had no presence in this region.  In
1996, Super Valu also expanded into southern California for the first time when it purchases the
operations of the Sav-U-Foods chain.
In 1994, six more large mergers took place.  The largest was Fleming’s acquisition of Scrivner
from its German owner Franz Haniel & Cie. at a cost of $1.09 billion.  Fleming was the number-one
merchant wholesaler at the time and Scrivner was number three.  Both had their headquarters in
Oklahoma City.  The immediate effect was to increase Fleming’s sales by nearly 50 percent overnight.
The two companies overlapped in no less than ten GMAs (see Table 8).  Barring unannounced
divestitures, the new Fleming company in 1994 operated in at least 39 of the 54 SAMI markets,
coming closer to becoming the first national grocery wholesaler than any other company in history;
its average market share in the 39 markets jumped to an impressive 17 percentage points.  However,
in late 1994 at least three warehouses were closed by Fleming in Alabama, Texas and Minnesota.  A
merger of this size often proves difficult to digest.  By 1996, the trade press was reporting that
Fleming was experiencing a number of difficulties: declining sales, low profits, and numerous retailer
suits against it.
Another large merger occurred in mid 1994 when Richfood of Mechanicsville, Virginia
bought Rotelle, a Philadelphia frozen-foods wholesaler.  Richfood is the dominant general-line
wholesaler in Virginia, with at least 30 percent of the Norfolk/Richmond GMA.  Richfood’s
wholesale sales increased from $1.3 billion to $1.7 billion as a result of the merger; moreover,
Richfood now operating in four GMAs, rather than just two.  In late 1995, Richfood made another
large acquisition when it paid $320 million to purchase Super Rite Foods, a large voluntary
wholesaler in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, with wholesale-retail sales of about $1.0 billion.  As a result
of both mergers, Richfood became the fourth largest merchant wholesaler in the United States and
the leading wholesaler in the Atlantic Seaboard with sales approaching $3 billion.  However, these
mergers also proved difficult for Richfood to absorb, causing earnings to fall in 1996.
Merger talks were held between Affiliated Foods Cooperative of Norfolk, Nebraska and
United A-G Cooperative in Nebraska in 1994, but no agreement was reached.  The two cooperatives
had about $750 million in combined sales.  Also in 1994, abortive merger discussions were held
between Roundy’s (Wisconsin) and Spartan Stores, Inc. of Grand Rapids, Michigan.  Combined sales
were almost $5 billion at the time and highly concentrated in Wisconsin and Michigan.
Some important mergers took place among integrated retailers in the early 1990s.  Ralph’s
the third largest Los Angeles retailer, was permitted to merge in 1994 with another large California
retailer, Food 4 Less, the fourth largest retailer in Los Angeles.  Combined retail sales in 1994 were21
about $5 billion, placing the company right behind number-one Von’s in the L.A. market (market
shares were about 22 to 24 percent, respectively.  Yucaipa Companies, the parent of both Ralph’s
and Food 4 Less, then acquired the Dominick’s chain in 1995, which gave Yucaipa about 20 percent
of the Chicago market.  Yucaipa’s $7 billion in sales made it the nation’s 8  or 9  largest grocery
th th
retailer in 1995.  Ahold, owner of several large grocery chains, mor than doubled its market share in
the New York City GMA by buying Mayfair Supermarkets for $180 million in 1995.  In the same
year, another foreign company, Loblaw’s of Canada, withdrew from U.S. grocery retailing by selling
its National Tea subsidiary to Schnucks for $215 million.  Schnucks’ purchase of 85 stores in the
Midwest pushed its already leading market position in St. Louis (30 percent of the GMA) to a
dominant one (about a 40 percent share).  Schnucks also gained a substantial foothold in the Chicago
market but, strangely, was required to divest 28 National Tea stores in the New Orleans area (where
Schnucks had no presence) to Schwegmann’s (a long established New Orleans retailer).  Another
horizontal merger occurred in 1995 when Harvest Foods purchased Rand’s.  Both of these companies
operated large general-line grocery warehouses in Little Rock, Arkansas.
In 1996, a major horizontal merger between integrated retailers joined Stop & Shop with
Purity Supreme.  These companies were first and third, respectively, in the Boston/Providence GMA
and now control about one-third of this large market and one-third of this large market and one-third
of the Hartford GMA as well.  Prior to the merger Stop & Shop owned four grocery warehouses
(1.03 million square feet) and Purity two (0.58 million square feet).
Finally, in November 1996, a large-scale merger took place between two merchant
wholesalers.  Nash Finch, the eighth largest U.S. wholesaler, acquired Super Food Services, Inc. for
about $500 million in debt. Super Food Services generated nearly $2 billion in wholesale grocery
sales in the two Florida GMAs from its large Orlando warehouses.  Nash Finch has about $2.5 billion
in national sales, but its territory extended to the southeast only as far as Georgia and the Carolinas.
Super Foods may have been under financial stress because of the loss of one-third of its Florida
business when it lost its Albertson’s account in Florida around 1994; Albertson’s purchased and
remodeled an 820,000 square foot warehouse in Plant City, Florida to serve its growing retail
business in the Tampa area.
Effects of Super Valu-Wetterau
Table 8 shows the percentage market shares of Super Value, Wetterau, and eight other
merchant wholesalers in 1990.  The two companies were active in 33 of the 54 GMAs, but they
overlapped in only six of these 33 markets.  That is, in 28 of the 33 markets, there was no known
change in sales concentration among actual rivals in the market (Table 10).  It is still possible that
Super Valu was one of the leading potential entrants in one or more of the markets where Wetterau
was the sole active seller (and vice versa for a Wetterau entry).  Identifying the most likely potential
entrants is no simple task.  Information on unutilized capacity in adjacent markets and internal
market-expansion plans may be necessary to make a confident identification of potential entrant.
However, even a casual examination of the geographic patterns of the two businesses shows
considerable potential entry in several Midwestern markets.  Super Valu’s large warehouses in Xenia,
Ohio and Fort Wayne, Indiana could have become a springboard for expansion into Wetterau’s two
Michigan markets; indeed, SUPERVALU added 20,000 square feet of warehouse space in Fort
Wayne in 1993.  Conversely, Wetterau’s huge Pittsburgh warehouse or smaller West Virginia facility22
could have invaded the Ohio markets served by Super Valu.  Likewise, Wetterau was well placed to
expand from its powerful Louisville base into parts of Super Valu’s Tennessee territory, and it could
have pushed a bit north from its St. Louis warehouses into Super Valu’s Iowa markets (it was already
serving central Illinois from there).  In sum, Wetterau and Super Valu bordered each other along a
curve almost 1,000 miles long, but this frontier was treated as more of a Maginot line than a place
for skirmishing.
In six GMAs, both companies had significant sales prior to the merger and, hence,
concentration markets, sales concentration among the merchant wholesalers was well over the 1800
mark after the merger (indeed, it was above 1800 before the merger in all GMAs save Indianapolis.
The HHI increases averaged nearly 1300 points, again well above the 100-point threshold.  In all six
overlap markets one of the two merged companies was already the largest merchant wholesaler prior
to the merger, so the merger merely solidified an already solid position.  After the merger, the new,
larger SUPERVALU company was the first or second leading wholesaler in no less than 23 of the
33 GMAs where it operated in 1992-1993.
It is difficult to imagine what rationalizations were proffered by the companies in defense of
their merger.  Even if the wholesalers claimed that they would be in direct competition with integrated
retailers, in at least four of the six overlap markets the post-merger HHIs and changes in HHI met
the government’s own merger criteria (Indianapolis and Charleston, WV may not have qualified).
One can only imagine that the GMAs adopted for analysis must have been much larger than those
used by the industry itself (thereby lowering the implied market shares of Super Valu and Wetterau)
or that antitrust officials believe that only two or three sellers are sufficient to ensure active
competition.
Insight into current merger enforcement standards for distributers is provided by the FTC’s
response to the proposed 1997 acquisition of Office Depot by Staples.  These companies together
account for approximately 80 percent of U.S. sales of office supplies and equipment sold through
“office superstores” (Wilke and Pereira).  The FTC voted to block the merger in March, 1997, even
though superstores accounted for only about 7 percent of the 1996 retail office-supplies market.  Key
elements in FTC thinking were that the superstore segment is sufficiently distinguished from other
office-supplies retailers that it forms a separate retail market; that while entry is easy in retailing
generally, entry is difficult in the superstore segment; that the superstore segment had already seen
the number of chains decline by more than 85 percent since 1988; and that claimed cost savings from
the merger were outweighed by price increases of about 5 to 15 percent in metropolitan areas where
only one of the two companies are present (as compared to the case when both are in active rivalry).
In addition, the FTC was concerned because the acquired company (Office Depot) was the price
leader in this market and because some planned expansions by both of the merged companies would
be cancelled as a result of the merger.  Ironically, at one point in the negotiations, the FTC offered
to permit the merger if the two leaders sold only 62 stores (4 percent of the two companies’ sales)
to the remaining third office superstore company, Office Max.  Had this sale gone forward, the office
superstore segment would have been left with two companies, one with 1100 stores and $10 billion
in sales, the other with 600 stores and $3 billion in sales.
It is likely that the Super Valu-Wetterau merger was permitted because the antitrust agency’s
economic models did not show price increases of more than 5 percent in the six overlap GMAs.23
However, it is poor logic to apply this 5 percent rule outside retail markets.  The 5 percent rule is
arbitrary, but it may be justified as a threshold price change that final consumers may notice.  In the
grocery retailing industry, gross margins are about 20 percent and profits about 1 percent of sales.
If a wholesaler were to raise its prices by 5 percent, their customers would incur losses of 4 percent
of sales ceteris paribus.  Even a 0.5 percent increase in wholesale prices would cut retailer prices in
half.  The “5-percent rule” is too crude in the first place, but is it clearly inappropriate in grocery
wholesaler mergers.
Conclusions
            This study describes and analyzes a sample of more than 600 large grocery warehouses
owned by integrated retailers and merchant wholesalers.  The sample covers 90 percent of sales to
grocery retailers in 54 wholesale grocery market areas (GMAs) defined by the Selling-Areas
Marketing, Inc. (SAMI) company.  Confidential SAMI documents permit the calculation of the most
comprehensive and precise list of estimates of concentration among grocery wholesalers in the early
1990s.  The geographic boundaries of the 54 GMAs are found to be nearly all well defined and largely
consistent with the definitions used by A.C. Nielsen and Progressive Grocer.  Both SAMI and Nielsen
tend to define GMAs that minimize leakages from warehouses inside the GMA boundaries as well
as shipments into the GMAs from wholesale establishments outside.  Areas that minimize trade across
boundaries comport with empirical economic concepts of well-defined markets.  All three companies
agree that the United States has between 50 and 60 GMAs, though among some of the smaller GMAs
there is not complete agreement on the inclusion or exclusion of certain metropolitan areas.
The mix of types of warehouse operators varies enormously across GMAs.  Voluntary
wholesalers dominate many GMAs in the Midwest, Texas, and Oklahoma.  Cooperative wholesalers
never have dominant shares in their GMAs, and very few GMAs are served by more than one sizable
voluntary wholesaler.  Voluntaries are most prominent in Wisconsin, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri,
and around Memphis.  Integrated retailers dominate wholesale activity in Denver, Chicago, Michigan,
and most Atlantic coastal GMAs.  Virtually all of the 50 largest grocery chains are fully integrated
into general-line grocery wholesaling; these retailers had 1990 sales of $1 billion or more.  Full
integration is also common among retailers in the $500 to $900 million sales range, but a slight
majority of this size class engaged in partial or tapered integration.  Warehouse integration was rare
among grocery retailers with fewer than 40 supermarkets generating less than $500 million in sales
or those with less than 3 percent of GMA sales.  Thus, these figures represent the thresholds for
supermarket operators to consider backward vertical integration; for convenience store chains the
thresholds are somewhat lower.
Warehouse sales efficiency varies considerably across GMAs and across types of warehouse
operators.  The United States has almost 275 million square feet of general-line grocery warehouse
space, of which at least 80 percent is accounted for in our sample of 600 warehouses.  The average
large U.S. warehouse generated $1,660 of retail grocery sales annually per square foot, but the
average ranged from $1,100 to $2,500 across GMAs.  Integrated retailers generally achieve the
highest sales productivity within given GMAs (as high as $3,000) and cooperative wholesalers the
smallest (as low as $300).  Average store size served appears to explain most of these
differences.turkey24
Grocery wholesaling is mostly highly concentrated within U.S. GMAs.  Of the 54 markets in
the sample, 44 are highly concentrated (CR4 > 60 percent) and none are unconcentrated (CR4 < 40
percent).  The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index also indicates that 48 have concentration levels high
enough to warrant an investigation by federal antitrust agencies should a significant horizontal merger
take place (HHI > 1000).
The concentration figures just mentioned assume that all warehouse operators are sellers in
the relevant market.  However, a case can be made that integrated retailers only rarely would consider
offering wholesaling services to a rival retail organization in the same GMA.  That is, from the point
of view of a newly entering grocery retailer, especially one not spreading out from an adjacent GMA,
linking up with an existing merchant wholesaler may be the only feasible option.  If this is so, then
concentration ratios calculated only among merchant wholesalers is a meaningful exercise.  Except
for New Orleans, the CR4 for merchants is in the highly concentrated range (CR4 > 60 percent).  All
GMAs have a merchant HHI above 1,000, and 42 of the 54 GMAs have HHI values greater than
1,800.  In almost one-third of the GMAs, one merchant wholesaler dominates all other merchants.
In October 1992, the second-largest and fourth-largest U.S. merchant grocery wholesalers
merged without opposition from federal antitrust authorities.  After the Super Valu-Wetterau merger,
many other such mergers were attempted or consummated.  An analysis of the 1992 merger finds that
sales concentration increased significantly (1,300 HHI points on average) in six GMAs, and in four
of six GMAs the HHI was above 1,800 prior to the merger.  These six cases clearly violated the 1992
federal merger enforcement guidelines, yet the merger was not opposed.  This episode and other
subsequent mergers demonstrate that federal antitrust policy is willing to permit the creation of
duopolies in any local distribution market where the effect of the merger is predicted to raise prices
by less than 5 percent.  Applying such an arbitrary rule in a very low-margin industry such as grocery
wholesaling is dubious indeed.  With average profit rates of about 1 percent on sales, a 5 percent
price increase would amount to a 500 percent increase in profits, ceteris paribus.  In the equally low-
margin grocery retailing industry, even a 0.5 percent increase in wholesale prices would be noticed
immediately, never mind a 5 percent increase.25
Table 1: SAMI Grocery Marketing Areas, 1966-1990.
   
   Year   SAMI Market           SAMI 1990               Market
Reporting   Issue  Name            Participant                Retail
  Began Number  Coverage Grocery Sales
a  b                   c
                                                                                              Percent                  $ Million
1966 1 Minneapolis 97 4211
1 Detroit 91 6051
1 St. Louis 87 3525
1 Houston 87 6199
2 Milwaukee 92 3508
2 Pittsburgh 84 4964
3 Boston 89 9830
3 Indianapolis 66 3045
4 New York City 80 24093
1967 5 Baltimore/Washington 59 10704
5 Philadelphia 88 10554
5 Buffalo/Rochester 90 4185
6 Los Angeles/San Diego 86 21400
9 Cleveland 75 5165
11 Miami 87 6459
11 San Francisco 76 13471
15 Atlanta 96 5197
15 Kansas City 79 2807
1968 18 Charlotte, NC 91 3410
20 Chicago 86 9844
21 New Orleans 60 5413
22 Seattle 86 4693
24 Dallas 74 7004
28 Denver 97 3872
29 Phoenix 89 5254
1969 39 Cincinnati 87 6531
1970 41 Jacksonville/Tampa 89 10311
1971 65 Birmingham 82 2916
1973 85 Memphis/Little Rock 63 3712
85 Syracuse/Rochester 91 316626
Table 1:  (Continued)
1974 101 Portland, OR 88 3409
101 Omaha 86 3068
101 Oklahoma City/Tulsa 85 3857
1976 123 Norfolk/Richmond 85 4116
123 Nashville/Knoxville 96 3765
123 San Antonio 73 5580









190 Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo 75 2501
1982 203 Hartford/Springfield 94 3889
203 Louisville/Lexington 79 2504
203 Spokane 91 1812
1983 214 Wichita 80 1223
214 Charleston/Huntington WV 80 1908
214 Quad Cities 85 1418
1984 229 Scranton 83 1340
229 Greenville/Spartanburg 87 1934
229 Peoria/Springfield 85 1738
1985 240 Portland, ME 89 2541
240 Green Bay 91 1747
240 Shreveport/Jackson 61 3215
Source: SAMI Participant Information Guides.
An “issue” covers exactly 28 days (roughly a lunar month) and 13 issues comprised almost one (solar) year.  The first
a
SAMI issue covered the four weeks ending October 7, 1966 and the last issue (No. 315) ended November 2, 1990.
From SAMI estimates of their coverage of the four major departments of grocery stores for issue
b
310.  The midpoint of the SAMI range was weighted by U.S. retail sales in each of the four departments.Table 2: Grocery Market Area Definitions, 1990.
      SAMI                               Nielsen                        Progressive                                 Areas of
     Market                               Major                            Grocer                                     Dominant
                                               Market                         Markets                                    Influence
bc d
New England:
1.  Portland/Concord Boston Boston Bangor, Portland +2
2.  Boston/Providence           Boston Boston Boston, Providence +1
3.  Hartford/Springfield Same Same Hartford, Springfield
Mid Atlantic:
1.  Albany/Schen./Troy Same Albany Albany +3
2.  Syracuse Same Albany Watertown, Syracuse, Utica, Binghamton +4
3.  Buffalo/Rochester Same Same Buffalo, Rochester, Erie, Elmira
4.  New York Same Same New York
5.  Scranton Baltimore Baltimore/Washington Scranton +1
6.  Philadelphia Same Same Philadelphia +3
7.  Baltimore/Washington Baltimore, Baltimore Baltimore, Washington, Harrisburg,
Washington and Salisbury +1
Great Lakes States
1.  Pittsburgh Same Same Pittsburgh, Clarksburg +5
2.  Charleston/Huntington  None Same Charleston, Bluefield +4
3.  Cleveland Same Same Cleveland, Youngstown +1
4.  Cincinnati/Columbus/ Cincinnati, Same Columbus, Dayton 
     Dayton  Columbus
5.  Detroit Same Same Detroit +3
6.  Grand Rapids/Kalamzoo Same Same Grand Rapids, Traverse City, Lansing +1
7.  Indianapolis Same Same Indianapolis, Lafayette +2
8.  Milwaukee Same Milwaukee Milwaukee, Madison +1
  9.  Green Bay Milwaukee Milwaukee Marquette, Wausau, 
Green Bay +2
10.  Chicago Same Chicago Chicago, South Bend
11.  Peoria/Springfield St. Louis St. Louis/Peoria Peoria, Springfield +2
Plains States (W. No. Central):Table 3: U.S. Grocery Wholesalers Ownership Types, by Market Area, 1990
1.  Minneapolis/St. Paul Same Same Minneapolis, Mankato +1
2.  Quad Cities Omaha/Des Moines Chicago/Quad Cities, Quad Cities, Ottumuwa,
Des Moines Cedar Rapids +3
3.  Omaha/Des Moines Omaha, Des Moines Omaha, Des Moines Omaha, Des Moines +2
4.  St. Louis Same  St. Louis/Peoria St. Louis +4
5.  Kansas City Same Same Kansas City, St. Joseph,
Topeka +2
6.  Wichita None Same Wichita +2
South Atlantic States:
1.  Norfolk/Richmond Same Same Charlottesville, Richmond,
North Hampton, Norfolk +2
2.  Raleigh/Greensboro Raleigh-Durham Charlotte Raleigh, Greensboro +3
3.  Charlotte, NC Same Charlotte Charlotte +3
  4.  Charleston/Savannah None Columbia, SC Charleston, Savannah
5.  Greenville/Columbia None Columbia, SC Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville +1
6.  Atlanta (not So. GA) Same Same Atlanta +5
7.  Jacksonville/Orlando Jacksonville, Jacksonville/ Jacksonville, Gainesville,
     Tampa (not Tallahassee) Orlando, Tallahassee, Orlando, Tampa +4
Tampa Tampa
8. Miami Same Same West Palm Beach, Ft. Myers,
Miami
Other Southern States:
1.  Louisville/Lexington Same Same Louisville, Lexington +4
2.  Nashville/Knoxville Same Same Nashville, Knoxville,
Bowling Green +6
3.  Birmingham/ Same Same Birmingham, Huntsville,
     Montgomery Tuscaloosa, Montgomery +1Table 3: U.S. Grocery Wholesalers Ownership Types, by Market Area, 1990
  4.  Memphis/Little Rock Memphis, Memphis Memphis, Jonesboro,
     (not Jackson, MS) Little Rock Little Rock +5
5.  Shreveport/Jackson Memphis Memphis, Greenwood, Jackson, Shreveport,
Dallas Monroe +6
6.  New Orleans New Orleans/ Same Mobile, Hattiesburg, Biloxi,
Mobile Baton Rouge, New Orleans +1
7.  Oklahoma City/Tulsa Oklahoma Oklahoma City, Oklahoma City, Tulsa +2
     (not Springfield, MO) City/Tulsa Springfield, MO
8.  Dallas Same Dallas (not Shreveport) Dallas-Ft. Worth +4
9.  Houston Same Same Houston +1
10.  San Antonio Same Same San Antonio, Austin, Victoria,
Laredo, Corpus Christi, Brownsville +1
Mountain States:
None None Billings, MT NA
1.  Denver Same Same Denver +2
2.  El Paso/Albuquerque/ None Same Amarillo, Lubbock, El Paso,
     Lubbock Odessa, Albuquerque
3.  Salt Lake City/Boise Same Same Boise, Twin Falls, Pocatello,
Salt Lake City
4.  Phoenix Same Same Flagstaff, Phoenix, Tucson +1
Pacific States:
1.  Spokane  None Same Spokane, Yakima +1
2.  Seattle/Tacoma Same Same Seattle-Tacoma +1
3.  San Francisco San Francisco,  San Francisco, San Francisco, Sacramento,
     (not Reno, NV) Sacramento Fresno Monterey, Fresno +1
4.  Portland, OR Same Same Portland, Eugene, Bend, Medford
5.  Los Angeles/ Los Angeles,  Same Los Angeles, Santa Barbara,
     San Diego/ San Diego Bakersfield, Palm Springs,
     Las Vegas San Diego, El Centro +1
54 markets defined by wholesale shipping patterns, covering about 75% of U.S. territory and 89% of grocery wholesale sales.   a
From Progressive Grocer Marketing Guidebook 1991. b
53 markets defined by wholesale shipping patterns, covering 100% of U.S. territory; 51 in continental U.S. c
Arbitron ADIs represent metropolitan areas that correspond to newspaper distribution areas or radio-television broadcast areas.  See Appendix A for details.  The number of partial d
ADIs is given after the plus sign.Table 3: U.S. Grocery Wholesalers Ownership Types, by Market Area, 1990
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SAMI                                                                  Share of GMA Retail Grocery Sales                             
Market                                       Integrated         Voluntary       Cooperative        Other
Area                                            Grocery          Wholesalers     Wholesalers     Merchant      Unknown
a
                                                   Retailers                                                       Wholesalers
    New England:                                                                                          Percent            
Portland ME 69.0 10.1 2.9 6.1 11.0
Boston 64.5 20.6 10.6 0.9 3.3
Hartford 43.8 19.3 11.8 24.5 0.6
    Mid Atlantic:
Albany 50.1 6.7 10.9 5.8 26.4
Syracuse   51.5 38.1 0.0 2.9 7.4
Buffalo 45.1 37.4 5.6 2.0 10.0
New York 35.5 17.4 25.0 2.0 19.0
Scranton 52.8 26.9 15.4 2.7 2.1
Philadelphia 45.9 17.4 15.1 13.0 6.6
Baltimore/Washington 63.6 28.3 0.0 2.0 6.0
Great Lakes States:
Pittsburgh 22.8 65.0 0.0 0.0 12.9
Charleston, WV 37.3 24.7 0.0 0.0 28.0
Cleveland 26.3 52.1 0.0 1.0 20.8
Cincinnati 40.6 46.2 0.0 0.6 8.6
Detroit 60.7 31.4 0.0 6.0 2.4
Grand Rapids 70.7 13.0 0.0 0.3 16.1
Indianapolis 42.6 23.5 3.0 2.9 28.0
Milwaukee 27.0 31.7 37.4 1.5   2.3
Green Bay 11.3 70.3 9.1 0.3 9.0
Chicago 61.1 16.0 16.0 3.0 3.7
Peoria 35.2 59.4 0.0 0.3 5.1Table 3.  (continued)
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West North Central States:
St. Louis 49.5 33.5 9.7 0.0 7.3
Quad Cities 59.2 25.5 0.0 0.3 15.0
Omaha 30.4 41.6 23.6 0.3 4.2
Minneapolis 0.1 97.0 0.0 0.0 2.9
Kansas City 18.3 20.9 39.2 0.8 21.0
Wichita 49.5 17.7 14.2 0.6 18.0
South Atlantic:
Norfolk 44.4 40.0 0.0 0.6 15.0
Raleigh 69.3 15.6 4.2 2.1 8.6
Charlotte, NC  77.1 11.3 2.3 0.4 9.0
Greenville, SC 71.6 14.3 0.0 1.0 13.0
Charleston, SC 72.9 19.2 0.0 0.8 7.0
Atlanta 79.7 15.4 0.0 1.2 4.0
Jacksonville 76.8 10.6 5.6 0.8 6.2
Miami 63.8 15.9 7.0 1.5 12.0
Other Southern Markets:
Louisville/Lexington 55.1 22.7 8.8 6.1 7.3
Nashville/Knoxville 60.1 36.0 3.0 0.0 1.0
Birmingham 62.1 16.6 9.9 0.2 11.2
Memphis/Little Rock 27.9 19.4 18.6 2.5 31.6
Shreveport/Jackson 37.1 27.9 0.0 0.0 35.0
New Orleans 46.4 5.5 7.9 2.2 38.0
Oklahoma City 23.2 43.8 18.5 0.9 13.2
Dallas 55.8 16.5 11.8 0.3 18.9
Houston 34.3 46.8 0.0 2.1 6.7
San Antonio 58.3 15.3 0.0 0.7 25.7
Mountain States:
Denver 84.0 12.9 0.0 0.0 3.0
El Paso/Lubbock 40.9 19.4 22.4 0.6 15.8
Salt Lake City 45.3 8.4 31.0 1.1 14.2
Phoenix 51.4 39.2 0.0 0.5 9.0
Pacific:
Spokane 67.6 17.9 8.2 0.0 6.3
Seattle 39.2 19.5 29.1 0.2 12.0
Portland, OR 42.2 18.7 26.7 0.5 12.0
San Francisco 53.6 13.8 8.1 8.8 16.8
Los Angeles 80.3 0.0 15.3 0.3 4.2
Portion of GMA not covered by sample companies.  Does not include manufacturers’ sales branches or brokers; only
a
includes integrated retailers or merchant wholesalers selling to grocery stores.Table 4: Number of Grocery Warehouse Participants, by Market Area, August 1990.
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    SAMI                                           Warehouses Supplying            Companies            Sample’s 
a               b          
   Market Area                        Dry       Refrig.  Froz.    HBA    Total         Retail     Whsl.              Sales    
                                                                                                               Grocery   Merchant     Coverage
                                  Percent
New England:
Portland/Concord 7 7 7 5 9 3 7 89
   Boston/Providence 18 17 17 18 25 9 6 97
   Hartford/Springfield 11 10 10 9 16 5 6 98
  
Mid Atlantic:
Albany/Troy 9 9 7 10 13 5 6 74
Syracuse 8 9 9 9 14 6 4 93
Buffalo/Rochester 9 9 10 8 10 3 5 90
New York 18 15 13 13 42 7 13 81
Scranton 7 7 7 5 10 5 6 98
Philadelphia 11 9 11 9 23 5 10 93
Baltimore/Wash. 10 8 12 10 20 7 5 94
Great Lakes States:
Pittsburgh 9 8 8 6 13 3 6 88
Charleston,WV 7 7 7 4 8 2 4 62
Cleveland 14 13 13 11 21 6 6 79
Cincinnati 13 13 13 12 16 4 8 91
Detroit 11 10 10 10 14 5 5 98
Grand Rapids 9 9 8 7 10 4 6 84
Indianapolis 9 9 9 8 13 3 7 72
Milwaukee 8 7 7 8 10 3 5 97
Green Bay 7 7 7 8 8 2 6 91
Chicago 14 13 13 13 17 4 9 96
Peoria 7 7 7 7 12 4 6 95
West North Central:
St. Louis 9 9 9 7 12 4 5 93
Quad Cities 6 6 6 8 9 4 4 85
Omaha 10 10 10 9 13 3 8 96
Minneapolis 5 5 5 5 7 1 4 97
Kansas City 7 7 6 5 10 3 5 79
Wichita 9 9 9 5 12 4 5 82Table 4: continued
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South Atlantic:
Norfolk/Richmond 7 6 8 6 12 4 4 85
Raleigh 13 12 13 11 18 6 9 91
Charlotte, NC 7 7 8 7 11 6 3 91
Greenville, SC 5 5 5 4 6 4 2 87
Charleston, SC 11 11 12 11 14 6 5 93
Atlanta 11 10 10 10 19 7 3 96
Jacksonville 15 15 16 12 19 7 3 96
Miami 7 7 8 7 1 4 5 88
Other South:
Louisville 11 11 12 8 17 4 8 93
Nashville 12 12 12 13 16 5 6 99
Birmingham 11 11 12 10 15 6 5 89
Memphis/Little Rock 9 10 9 8 12 4 5 68
Shreveport/Jackson 12 11 12 10 17 7 2 65
New Orleans 13 13 14 10 20 6 7 62
Oklahoma City 10 11 10 4 14 4 5 87
Dallas 12 13 12 11 17 11 5 81
Houston 8 7 7 8 13 6 6 93
San Antonio 11 9 10 10 17 7 6 74
Mountain States:
Denver 6 6 6 7 9 3 3 97
El Paso/Lubbock 10 11 10 9 15 6 6 84
Salt Lake City 8 8 8 8 11 4 3 86
Phoenix 8 6 6 6 10 6 2 91
Pacific:
Spokane 8 8 8 6 10 5 2 94
Seattle 7 7 7 5 9 3 5 88
Portland, OR 9 7 7 8 11 3 5 88
San Francisco 16 12 14 11 22 8 6 83
Los Angeles 12 11 11 10 15 9 2 96
Sources: SAMI Participant Information Guides (Issue 311) and Progressive Grocer Marketing Guidebook (1991).
Number of in-sample establishments, most inside the GMA, some outside it.
a
Number of in-sample companies operating sample establishments.
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Table 5: Sales Concentration of Grocery Wholesalers, by Local Grocery Markets, 1990.
 
                                                   Leading Firms' Shares                     Merchant Wholesale
a    b
Market Area                                                            Top               
                                             1       2       3       4       4       HHI             Top 4           HHI
New England:
Portland, ME 45 23 6 6 79 2630 87 2046
Boston 18 13 12 11 54 1089 84 1870
Hartford 24 15 14 9 62 1424 70 1389
Mid Atlantic:
Albany 25 22 11 5 63 1281 65 1590
Syracuse 29 21 12 8 70 1616 89 5061
Buffalo 23 22 21 14 80 1692 90 2947
New York 13 12 9 7 42 612 62 1142
Scranton 28 21 15 15 79 1665 93 2642
Philadelphia 24 12 12 11 58 1086 73 1446
Baltimore/Wash. 30 17 13 7 68 1546 88 2769
Great Lakes States:
Pittsburgh 25 22 19 6 74 1615 79 2281
Charleston, WV 31 19 6 4 60 1382 62 2401
Cleveland 18 15 12 9 55 928 71 1463
Cincinnati 30 19 15 9 73 1647 83 2477
Detroit 25 19 16 11 71 1519 90 3206
Grand Rapids 42 24 4 3 73 2420 76 1589
Indianapolis 20 19 10 7 56 981 66 1284
Milwaukee 32 18 14 13 76 1875 93 2914
Green Bay 28 19 17 11 75 1645 83 1990
Chicago 30 20 9 7 65 1531 73 1593
Peoria 28 15 13 12 68 1467 90 2861
West North Central:
St. Louis 28 21 18 7 74 1658 85 2622
Quad Cities 28 25 15 9 78 1777 85 3267
Omaha 26 17 14 8 64 1428 73 1601
Minneapolis 47 35 10 6 97 3473 97 3473
Kansas City 37 15 9 6 67 1754 78 2740
Wichita 41 12 12 8 72 2016 76 2069
Table 5.  (continued)35
South Atlantic:
Norfolk/Richmond 31 30 10 5 76 2004 85 4408
Raleigh 36 16 10 8 69 1793 71 1778
Charlotte, NC 35 16 13 11 76 1921 91 5666
Greenville, SC 31 17 16 14 78 1765 87 6607
Charleston, SC 19 19 14 9 60 1209 91 3084
Atlanta 34 17 14 8 73 1812 96 6829
Jacksonville/Tampa 31 29 9 8 78 1996 86 3251
Miami 38 24 12 6 80 2246 84 2524
Other Southern Markets:
Louisville/Lexington 30 17 9 9 65 1520 76 1651
Nashville/Knoxville 37 11 10 9 67 1837 87 2174
Birmingham 29 17 10 9 65 1414 85 2091
Memphis/Little Rock 17 16 13 6 51 794 64 1388
Shreveport/Jackson 16 13 12 11 52 728 65 2171
New Orleans 15 12 8 8 43 546 58 1291
Oklahoma City 20 20 17 12 69 1284 77 1748
Dallas 14 12 11 11 48 802 81 2547
Houston 43 19 13 9 84 2513 92 5149
San Antonio 45 7 6 6 63 2181 73 1878
Mountain States:
Denver 46 25 13 9 93 2977 97 5694
El Paso/Lubbock 29 16 13 10 67 1419 81 2087
Salt Lake City 31 22 21 6 80 1938 81 4854
Phoenix 39 19 17 8 83 2250 91 8061
Pacific:
Spokane 28 23 18 11 80 1834 94 5000
Seattle 29 25 16 10 80 1846 88 3641
Portland, OR 25 21 13 12 71 1487 87 2995
San Francisco 20 20 14 8 62 1142 80 2274
Los Angeles 25 24 15 13 78 1705 98 9253
Sources:  SAMI Participant Information Guides (Issue 311) and Progressive Grocer Marketing Guidebook (1991).
Includes all sample wholesaling companies.
a
Includes only merchant wholesalers in sample.  Market shares take into account portion of market not covered by
b
SAMI data.36
Table 6: Market Shares of Ten Leading Grocery Retailers,by Market Area, 1990.
SAMI                                                                            Company                                                       
Market                              
Area                              Am.   Kroger    Safe-   A&P    Winn-    Albert-    Ahold   Publix   Von’s    Food
                                    Stores                 Way                Dixie      son’s                                             Lion
                             
                                                         Percent
New England:
Portland, OR 9.4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
   Boston --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.3 --- --- ---
Hartford --- --- --- 1.4 --- --- 13.7 --- --- ---
Mid Atlantic:
Albany --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.7 --- --- ---
Syracuse --- --- --- --- --- --- 6.0 --- --- ---
Buffalo --- --- --- --- --- --- 23.3 --- --- ---
New York 1.3 --- --- 6.2 --- --- 2.2 --- --- ---
Scranton --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Philadelphia 23.8 --- --- 7.1 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Baltimore/Washington 2.6 --- 17.5 5.8 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Great Lakes States:
Pittsburgh --- 3.4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Charleston, WV --- 31.0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Cleveland --- 1.4 --- --- --- --- --- — --- ---
Cincinnati --- 30.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Detroit --- 0.7 --- 24.0 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Grand Rapids --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Indianapolis --- 19.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Milwaukee --- --- --- 14.0 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Green Bay --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Chicago 29.9 --- --- 1.5 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Peoria 8.4 15.4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
West North Central:
St. Louis --- 2.1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Quad Cities 5.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Omaha --- --- --- 2.6 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Minneapolis --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Kansas City --- 5.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Wichita --- 40.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---Table 6: continued
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South Atlantic:
Norfolk/Richmond --- --- 4.9 5.2 3.7 --- --- --- --- 30.6
Raleigh --- 5.8 --- 1.7 15.6 --- --- --- --- 36.6
Charlotte, NC --- --- --- 1.7 15.6 --- 10.5 --- --- 36.6
Greenville, SC --- --- --- --- 17.4 --- 30.9 --- --- 7.7
Charleston, SC --- 9.0 --- --- 8.5 --- 14.4 --- --- 18.7
Atlanta --- 34.1 --- 5.4 16.6 --- 3.6 --- --- ---
Jacksonville/Tampa --- --- --- --- 31.1 --- --- 29.3 --- 2.0
Miami --- --- --- --- 23.9 --- --- 38.5 --- ---
Other Southern Markets:
Louisville/Lexington --- 30.2 --- --- 17.5 --- --- --- --- ---
Nashville/Knoxville --- 36.7 --- --- 3.3 --- --- --- --- 9.3
Birmingham --- 4.1 --- --- 17.4 --- --- --- --- ---
Memphis/Little Rock --- 15.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Shreveport/Jackson --- 12.6 --- 1.5 3.6 --- --- --- --- ---
New Orleans --- 1.2 --- 4.1 15.4 --- --- --- --- ---
Oklahoma City 0.4 --- --- --- 1.5 --- --- --- --- ---
Dallas 0.2 --- --- --- 7.6 4.9 --- --- --- ---
Houston --- 19.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
San Antonio  --- 3.9 --- --- --- 5.0 --- --- --- ---
Mountain States:
Denver --- 45.7 24.6 --- --- 13.5 --- --- --- ---
El Paso/Lubbock 0.5 --- --- --- --- 8.0 --- --- --- ---
Salt Lake City --- 1.8 --- --- --- 21.8 --- --- --- ---
Phoenix --- 21.3 16.6 --- --- 1.8 --- --- --- ---
Pacific:
Spokane --- --- 23.0 --- --- 11.2 --- --- --- ---
Seattle 2.8 --- 25.0 --- --- 9.6 --- --- --- ---
Portland, OR --- --- 21.1 --- --- 9.0 --- --- --- ---
San Francisco 19.9 2.2 20.2 --- --- 3.3 --- --- --- ---
Los Angeles 25.4 --- --- --- --- 6.3 --- --- 23.8 ---
U.S. Average Shares 10.0 15.9 17.2 6.1 13.3 8.6 10.9 33.9 23.8 20.0
Share of warehouse shipments into GMA by company measured by retail sales of the stores served not necessarily the same
a
as retail sales share.Table 7: Contact Point Analysis for the Ten Leading U.S. Grocery Retailers, 1990.
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                                                   American        Kroger        Safe-        A&P        Winn-        Albert-        SMG        Publix        Von’s        Food        Average
Company (GMAs)                          Stores                             way                          Dixie          son’s                                                             Lion 
                                                                                                            Percent
a
American Stores (13)                      --- 8 23 31 15 31 23 0 8 0 15
Kroger                (25) 8 --- 12 20 32 20 0 0 0 12 12
Safeway              (8) 33 11 --- 22 11 67 0 0 0 11 17
A&P                   (14) 31 38 15 --- 46 0 0 0 0 23 17
Winn-Dixie         (15) 13 53 7 40 --- 7 0 13 0 47 20
Albertson’s         (11) 45 27 55 0 9 --- 0 0 0 0 15
Ahold                 (10) 20 20 20 40 40 0 --- 0 0 30 17
Publix                 (2) 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 --- 0 50 17
V o n ’ s                   ( 1 ) 1 0 0 0 0000 1 0 0 0 - - -02 2
Food Lion           (7) 0 43 0 43 100 0 0 14 0 --- 22
Source: Table 6
--- = not defined
The denominator is the total number of GMAs in which the left column companies operate.  There are 54 GMAs.
aTable 8: Market Shares of Ten Leading Grocery Wholesalers, by Market Area, 1990
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                                   Company
SAMI                                                                                                                        
Market                                          Flem-      Super      Scrivner        Wett-          Wake        Penn        Roundy’s        Nash          Cert.            Assoc.
Area                                               ing         Valu                             erau             Fern       Traffic     &Scot Lad       Finch        Grocers           Whsl.
                                                                                                                                                                                                   of L.A.        Grocers
                                                                                                                                    Percent
a
New England:
Portland, ME --- --- --- 6.1 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Boston --- --- --- 8.5 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Hartford --- --- --- --- 5.0 --- --- --- --- ---
Mid Atlantic:
Albany --- --- --- --- 10.9 1.6 --- --- --- ---
Syracuse --- --- 9.0 --- --- 29.1 --- --- --- ---
Buffalo --- --- 14.1 --- --- 2.5 --- --- --- ---
New York --- --- --- --- 12.5 --- --- --- --- ---
Scranton --- --- 2.2 9.8 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Philadelphia 10.7 --- --- 6.8 11.6 --- --- --- --- ---
Baltimore/Washington --- --- 7.1 2.0 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Great Lake States:
Pittsburgh --- 25.4 3.9 22.3 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Charleston, WV 3.7 1.9 --- 19.1 --- 6.3 --- 2.1 --- ---
Cleveland 8.5 --- --- --- --- --- 4.2 --- --- ---
Cincinnati --- 15.1 2.0 --- --- 8.8 1.7 --- --- ---
Detroit --- --- --- 18.3 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Grand Rapids --- --- --- 3.0 --- --- 0.8 --- --- ---
Indianapolis 0.2 10.2 --- 6.3 --- --- 6.7 --- --- ---
Milwaukee 17.7 12.3 5.7 --- --- --- 31.7 --- --- ---
Green Bay 3.1 27.8 3.5 --- --- --- 3.5 --- --- ---
Chicago --- 5.4 2.3 --- --- --- 4.6 --- --- ---
Peoria 2.9 27.9 12.6 12.1 --- --- 4.0 --- --- ---40
Table 8: (Continued)
West North Central:
St. Louis 5.7 7.1 --- 20.6 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Quad Cities --- 9.1 1.7 --- --- --- --- 14.7 --- ---
Omaha 5.5 13.8 7.7 --- --- --- --- 10.8 --- ---
Minneapolis --- 46.6 34.1 --- --- --- --- 6.4 --- ---
Kansas City 15.5 --- --- 5.4 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Wichita 12.2 --- 3.4 --- --- --- --- 2.1 --- ---
South Atlantic:
Norfolk/Richmond 0.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Raleigh 0.3 --- 7.4 --- --- --- --- 2.9 --- ---
Charlotte, NC --- --- 4.4 --- --- --- --- 2.1 --- ---
Greenville, NC --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Charleston, SC --- --- --- 6.6 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Atlanta --- 14.1 1.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Jacksonville/Tampa 0.5 --- --- 1.9 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Miami 11.8 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Other Southern Markets:
Louisville/Lexington 5.8 6.2 --- 9.0 --- --- 1.7 --- --- ---
Nashville/Knoxville 10.6 --- 3.8 10.4 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Birmingham 1.1 5.7 2.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Memphis/Little Rock 16.7 2.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Shreveport/Jackson 16.3 11.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
New Orleans 1.7 3.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Oklahoma City 20.1 --- 17.0 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Dallas 10.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Houston 12.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
San Antonio 2.8 --- 6.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---Table 8: continued
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Mountain States:
Denver --- 9.4 --- --- --- --- --- 3.5 --- ---
El Paso/Lubbock 16.1 2.0 --- --- --- --- --- 1.3 --- ---
Salt Lake City 5.8 2.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Phoenix 39.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Pacific:
Spokane --- 17.9 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 8.2
Seattle 1.5 16.0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 29.1
Portland, OR 5.9 12.8 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.9
San Francisco 13.8 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 7.8 ---
Los Angeles --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 15.3 ---
U.S. Average Shares 9.0 11.3 5.9 9.9 10.0 9.7 6.5 4.5 11.6 13.1
The share of warehouse movements into a GAM, measured by retail sales of stores served.  Some warehouses located outside the GMA.
aTable 9: Contact Point Analysis for the Ten Leading U.S. Grocery Wholesalers, 1990
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                                       Flem-        Super        Scriv-       Wet-       Wake-         Penn        Roundy’s      Nash        Cert.        Assoc.           Average    
Company (GMAs)           ing            Valu           ner          erau         fern          Traffic                            Finch       Groc.        Whsl. 
Fleming   (30) --- 57 33 23 3 3 20 10 3 7 16
Super Valu (25) 68 --- 44 20 0 8 24 16 0 100 31
Scrivner (20) 50 55 --- 20 0 20 15 20 0 0 20
Wetterau (14) 50 36 29 --- 7 7 29 0 0 0 18
Wakefern (4) 25 0 0 25 --- 25 0 0 0 0 8
Penn Traffic Co. (6) 17 50 67 17 17 --- 17 0 0 0 21
Roundy’s (8) 75 75 38 50 0 13 --- 0 0 0 28
Nash-Finch (6) 50 83 67 0 0 0 0 --- 0 0 22
Certified Grocers
 of Los Angeles (2) 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --- 0 6
Associated
 Whsl. Grocers (3) 67 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --- 19
Source: Table 8
--- = not defined
Share of warehouse shipments into GMA by company measured by retail sales of the stores served.  Not necessarily the same as retail sales share.
aTable 10: Market Concentration Effects of the 1992 Super Valu-Wetterau Merger, by GMA.
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                                         Market                Market                           HHI Sales Concentration
    Grocery                    Rank in 1990            Rank                                                                                     
b
     Marketing                                                In 1992
b
     Area                      Super      Wett-                                     1990                1992               Change
a
                                   Valu        erau
Portland, ME --- 1/3 1/3 2046 2046 0
Boston --- 2/7 2/7 1870 1870 0
Scranton --- 3/5 3/5 2642 2642 0
Philadelphia --- 4/7 4/7 1446 1446 0
Pittsburgh 1/1 2/2 1/1 2075 4008 1933
Charleston, WV 3/5 1/2 1/2 4408 4869 461
Cincinnati 2/3 --- 2/3 2477 2477 0
Detroit --- 1/2 1/2 3206 3206 0
Grand Rapids --- 3/5 3/5 1589 1589 0
Indianapolis 1/3 2/5 1/3 1024 2202 1178
Milwaukee 3/5 --- 3/5 2914 2914 0
Green Bay 1/1 --- 1/1 1990 1990 0
Chicago 3/5 --- 3/5 1593 1593 0
Peoria 1/1 3/4 1/1 2861 4364 1503
Quad Cities 2/4 --- 2/4 3267 3267 0
St. Louis 2/4 1/2 1/1 2961 4545 1584
Omaha/Des Moines 2/3 --- 2/3 1601 1601 0
Minneapolis 1/1 --- 1/1 3473 3473 0
Kansas City --- 3/5 3/5 2740 2740 0
Charleston, SC --- 2/7 2/7 3084 3084 0
Atlanta 1/3 --- 1/3 6829 6829 0
Louisville 3/7 1/3 1/3 1943 3000 1057
Nashville --- 2/3 2/3 2174 2174 0
Birmingham 3/6 --- 3/6 2091 2091 0
Memphis 4/7 --- 4/7 1388 1388 0
Shreveport 2/3 --- 2/3 2171 2171 0
New Orleans 2/6 --- 2/6 1291 1291 0
Denver 1/4 --- 1/4 5694 5694 0
El Paso 5/6 --- 5/6 2087 2087 0
Salt Lake City    3/5 --- 3/5 4854 4854 044
Table 10: (continued)
                                  
Spokane 1/3 --- 1/3 5000 5000 0
Seattle 2/3 --- 2/3 3641 3641 0
Portland, OR 2/3 --- 2/3 2995 2995
____________________________________________________________________________________
Source:
List contains all 23 GMAs in which one or both of the companies had significant market shares, usually more than 1 percent
a
and almost always more than 2 percent.
First position is the rank among merchant wholesalers only; after the slash in position among all warehouse operators,
b
including integrated retailers.  The first number is the most relevant for competition analysis.45
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Endnotes
1.   The 14 GMAs were apparently chosen because MSA boundaries seem to correspond to a
priori notions of what constituted a proper geographic market boundary.  The Census
Bureau tends to over classify specialty wholesalers (see Marion et al: 365).  Moreover,
MSA boundaries are drawn to represent population centers that form cohesive labor
markets (as revealed by commuting patterns), not necessarily reasonable wholesale trading
zones.
2. In 1989, the Census Bureau defined 334 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), many of
which were further grouped into 20 very large consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(CMSAs).  MSAs were formerly called SMSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas).
3. SAMI was bought by Time, Inc., in the early 1970s and was eventually resold by Arbitron. 
Because SAMI was late to develop a retail scanner service, it was overtaken by
Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) in the late 1980s.  SAMI ceased operations in
December 1990 and was liquidated in March 1991.  Most of SAMI’s data was donated to
Purdue University at that time and placed in an archive in the Krannert Library.
4. The drug store service had SARDI as its acronym.  In the 1970s, SAMI attempted to
develop a product tracking service for foodservice items, but coverage never extended
beyond about six GMAs.  The experimental service never drew sufficient interest from
foodservice and food manufacturing clients to become profitable.
5. SAMI employees said that a considerable effort was required to correct for inter-GMA
shipments of wholesaler-diverters.  Few, if any, of their participants would admit to
engaging in diverting and retailers themselves were reluctant to admit purchases from
diverters.
6. Leakage from warehouses located in the GMA of interest to areas outside the GMA
cannot be determined from the SAMI guidelines, but SAMI could always expand the
number of stores on the fringe of the GMA so as to minimize outward leakage.  Such
expansion would be limited by increased imports from other SAMI GMAs.
7. This problem is referred to as the “principal-agent” problem in the economic literature. 
This problem is most apparent in the case of merchant wholesalers but also applies in the
case of cooperative wholesalers to a lesser extent.
8. Major retailers drop in and out of various editions of the Marketing Guidebook, so
multiple editions were consulted.  The SAMI Participant Guides also provided names of
retailers that met the size criterion.
9. Numbers of truck and trailers are sometimes given when square footage is not. 
Occasionally, numbers and types of stores, local sales revenues, and information on
companies of comparable size, type of business, and location are used as reference points.48
10. Giant Food’s (No. 13) arrangement with Super Rite was apparently dropped in 1991 or
1992.  Food 4 Less (No. 22) had just purchased new stores in California.  Retailers 29, 35,
and 46 are partially integrated.  Retailers No. 41 and 49 are fully integrated in one GMA
but not in another.
11. Many small chains own warehouses smaller than 100,000 square feet, but these tend to be
used for produce or short term storage of dry groceries.
12. The only alternative is direct manufacture-retailer delivery or direct consumer marketing,
but these methods account for less than one-fifth of the sales these methods account for
less than one-fifth of the sales of consumer-ready foods in the United States.
13. The Department of Justice - Federal Trade Commission merger guidelines state that a
post-merger Herfindahl index of 1800 or more will likely trigger an investigation; only an
index level below 1000 is unlikely to meet with agency opposition.
14. Total U.S. grocery sales in 1990 were $369 billion, but the general-line grocery
warehouses listed in Appendix Table 1 are believed to cover only about 80% of U.S.
warehouse capacity.
15. On average, the market shares of wholesalers omitted from the SAMI sample accounted
for 4.8 percentage points of GMA retail sales.  The largest single omission was Giant
Stores in Washington, DC (35 percent share).  Sales data on SAMI omissions are
estimated from Progressive Grocer data.
16. By “number of warehouses” is meant the number of establishments supplying grocery
products in the sample.  Most are inside the GMA, but some ship from outside the GMA
boundaries.  Several are counted more than once.  Perhaps it is easier to think of the
number as the number of distinct zones to which a single warehouse ships.
17. The CR4 is the sum of the shares of the top four companies.  The HHI is the sum of the
squares of the percentage market shares.  A monopoly has an HHI of 10,000, whereas an
unconcentrated market has an HHI close to zero.
18. Recall that the depopulated portions of the northern High Plains are not covered by SAMI
markets.
19. Information on mergers and acquisitions is taken from ERS (1996) and a Lexis-Nexis
search of articles appearing in Supermarket News, Progressive Grocer, and other trade
magazines.                         49
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                                        Integrated Retailers         General Merchants        Specialty Merchants   
                                                                                                                                                      
Market Area                     No.                 Size          No.                Size          No.               Size
aa
                                                           ‘000 ft.                            ‘000 ft.                            $ mil.
22
New England:
Boston 12 3846 4 1473 3 88
Portland, ME 3 1335 4 779 2 154
Hartford 7 2111 3 1482 1 NA
Mid Atlantic:
Albany 5 1350 5 1591 1 29
Syracuse 5 846 8 1166 1 40
Buffalo 4 1024 4 1322 1 83
New York 20 5278 13 5465 5 817
Scranton 4 2198 8 2537 1 37
Philadelphia 4 1789 3 1128 5 1109
Baltimore/Wash. 10 3446 5 836 3 436
East North Central:
Pittsburgh 2 400 16 4283 0 0
Charleston, WV 2 710 1 306 0 0
Cleveland 6 2475 10 3107 2 50
Cincinnati 5 4192 8 2742 2 42
Detroit 4 1350 6 1769 0 0
Grand Rapids 13 3892 2 521 1 8
Indianapolis 6 1236 5 1499 1 12
Milwaukee 9 836 5 2617 1 52
Green Bay 0 0 6 2374 1 5
Chicago 9 4784 6 3950 4 303
Peoria 0 0 2 1243 1 5
West North Central:
Minneapolis 0 0 7 4532 0 0
Quad Cities 0 0 0 0 0 0
Omaha 3 1420 8 3306 1 8
St. Louis 2 1170 8 4487 2 61
Kansas City 1 675 6 1991 1 22
Wichita 2 700 5 1270 1 7Appendix Table 1: Number and Size of Grocery Warehouses in 54 Sample GMAs, 1990
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South Atlantic:
Norfolk/Richmond 3 1299 5 2505 2 25
Raleigh 3 2335 10 2563 1 20
Charlotte 5 2779 3 1220 0 0
Greenville, SC 4 3214 4 162 1 20
Charleston, SC 3 710 5 789 2 11
Atlanta 10 3199 4 1433 1 60
Jacksonville/Tampa 11 7306 7 3784 1 83
Miami 3 3052 4 2457 1 96
Other Southern:
Louisville/Lexington 3 2050 4 1051 1 6
Nashville/Knoxville 5 2718 4 1000 0 0
Birmingham 5 3271 5 1522 1 5
Memphis/Little Rock 2 1400 5 1476 0 0
Shreveport/Jackson 2 1446 3 1385 0 0
New Orleans 8 2301 2 841 1 62
Oklahoma City 2 1700 6 1808 0 0
Dallas 15 5012 3 1724 1 5
Houston 5 1575 3 2156 1 22
San Antonio 7 2421 4 1608 2 16
Mountain States:
Denver 7 1658 2 1020 0 0
El Paso/Lubbock 2 1631 5 2314 0 0
Salt Lake City 3 688 4 1532 0 0
Phoenix 8 3185 1 1300 1 112
Pacific:
Spokane 1 1200 2 355 0 0
Seattle 1 1200 5 1829 0 0
Portland, OR 6 2768 5 2012 0 0
San Francisco 13 7365 7 2915 2 143
Los Angeles 19 6070 4 3003 1 55
Total U.S. 292 120,673 274 100,834 --- 4114
The size in square footage is unknown for these frozen foods, HBA, housewares, foodservice,
a
and rack jobbers but may be about one-fifth of the dollars shown (in thousands).Appendix Table 2: Wholesale Integration by U.S. Grocery Retailers, 1990
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                      Company                                              Retail Sales                   Stores                                               Wholesale Operations                
a
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Rank/Name                        Location                      1990   1992   1994        Total    Super-             Market Areas                               Ware-         GMA
                                                                                                                   1992   Markets                                                                houses        Share      
cd
    
                                                                                   Billion dollars                                                                                                ‘000 ft. Pct.
2               
1.  Kroger                             Cincinnati, OH 22.1 22.1 23.0 2215 3672 23 9828(24) 15.9
b
2.  American Stores Salt Lake City, UT 22.2 19.1 18.4 925 5274 12 7351(15) 10.0
b
3.  Safeway Stores Oakland, CA 14.9 15.2 15.6 1105 2141   9 5485(6) 17.2
b
4.  A&P/Aldi Montvale, NJ      --- 11.6 10.3 1202 1776 13 7217(22) 6.1
b
5.  Winn-Dixie Jacksonville, FL 9.7 10.3 11.1 1166 1800 15 9356(13) 13.3
b
6.  Albertson’s Boise, ID 8.2 10.2 11.9 651 1741 11 3485(6) 8.6
b
7.  Food Lion Salisbury, NC 5.6 7.2 7.9 1012 1012   7 5474(5) 20.0
b
8.  Publix Lakeland, FL 5.8 6.3 8.7 416 1060   2 4515(5) 33.9
b
9.  Ahold Intl. Netherlands 4.5 5.9 6.5 506 670 10 3515(6) 10.9
eEb
10. Von’s Companies Arcadia, CA 5.3 5.6 5.0 346 566   1 1464(3) 23.8
b
11. Southland Corp. Dallas, TX 8.4 7.4 6.7 --- --- Baltimore, Jacksonville,              --- 1.6
Miami, Dallas, Houston, L.A.
12. Pathmark Woodbridge, NJ 6.3       4.3 4.0 147 441 Hartford, NYC, Philly 1132(4) 9.7
E
      (Supermarkets General)
13. Giant Foods Landover, MD 3.1 3.1 3.7 156 368 Baltimore [Super Rite] 1371(4) 35.0
j
14. Stop & Shop Quincy, MA 3.1 3.4 3.8 120 262 Boston, Hartford, NYC 1031(4) 13.8
15. H.E. Butt SanAntonio, TX 2.9 3.2 4.7 213 471 Houston, San Antonio 1440 32.0
EE
16. Circle K --- 3.1 3.7
17. Fred Meyer Portland, OR 2.5 2.9 3.1 72 216 Seattle, Spokane, Portland 1742(2) 13.8
18. Ralph’s Compton, CA 2.7 2.8 5.0 160 160 Los Angeles 356 15.3
E
19. Grand Union Wayne, NJ 3.0 2.8 2.4 252 384 Albany, Syracuse, NYC, 
Atlanta 1316(8) 13.8
20. Bruno’s Birmingham, AL 2.4 2.7 2.8 256 570 Atlanta, Birmingham, 
New Orleans 1542(2) 14.353
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21. Super Valu Minneapolis, MN - — 2.7 264 456 Cincinnati, Indianapolis, 5326(5) ---
E ---
      (Cub Division) Chicago, Minneapolis, 
Denver
22. Smith’s  Salt Lake City, UT   ---  2.6 3.0 121 359 El Paso, Phoenix,  258 9.4
Salt Lake City
23. Food 4 Less La Habra, CA 1.4 2.5 0.8 249 249 Los Angeles [+Certified of LA] 171 11.1
gE
24. Meijer Grand Rapids, MI 1.5 2.3 3.9 80 238 Detroit, Grand Rapids 1800(10) 24.7
EE E
25. Hy Vee Chariton, IA 2.0 2.3 2.5 160 220 Quad Cities, Omaha 1105(3) 30.1
26. Hannaford Bros. Scarborough, ME 1.7 2.1 2.3 95 175 Portland ME 735(2) 50.3
27. Spartan Stores Grand Rapids, MI 2.0 2.1 2.2 556 623 Detroit, Grand Rapids 1875(2) 34.1
E
28. Penn Traffic Johnstown, PA 2.0 2.1 3.3 184 309 Albany, Syracuse, Buffalo, 2322(4) 14.3
hE E E
Cincinnati, Charleston WV
29. Giant Eagle Pittsburgh, PA 1.5 2.7 2.0 134 134 Pittsburgh [+OK, Tamarkin] 400 23.1
E
30. Dominick’s North Lake, IL 2.0 2.0   2.4 101 173 Chicago 1200 22.7
EE
31. Stater Bros. Coulton, CA 1.5 1.8 1.6 108 108 Los Angeles 900 6.1
32. Shaw’s E. Bridgewater,MA 1.7 1.8 2.1 81 243 Boston 460(2) 14.2
33. De Moula’s Tewksbury, MA 1.1 1.4 1.6 50 66 Boston 700(2) 12.4
34. Schnuck Markets St. Louis, MO 1.1 1.4 1.2 63 155 St. Louis 600(2) 31.8
EE
35. Save Mart Modesto, CA 1.5 1.3 1.1 94 158 San Francisco [+Westpac] 220 ---
E
36. Weis Markets  Sunbury, PA 1.3 1.3 1.6 141 169 Scranton, Philladelphia, 1348(2) 3.9
Baltimore
37. Harris-Teeter Mathews, NC 1.2 1.3 1.6 135 135 Raleigh, Charlotte,  615(2) 10.3
Charleston, SC
38. National Tea Hazelwood, MO 1.1 1.2 92 198 St. Louis, New Orleans 837(2) 16.8
E
39. Kash N’ Karry Tampa, FL 1.0 1.2 1.1 116 224 Jacksonville 625 9.2
E
40. Jitney Jungle Jackson, MS 1.0 1.2 1.2 100 166 Memphis, Shreveport 915 12.0
41. Randall’s Houston, TX 0.9 1.2 2.5 48 142 Houston [+Fleming] 895(3) 10.0
m
42. Marsh Indianapolis, IN 1.1 1.2 1.3 259 101 Cincinnati, Indianapolis 606(3) 29.7
43. Wegman’s Rochester, NY --- 1.1 1.8 45 135 Syracuse, Buffalo 450 18.4
EE
44. Golub Corp. Schenectady, NY 1.0 1.1 1.2 85 163 Albany, Syracuse 667(2) 19.1
45. Eagle Food Ctrs. Milan, IL 1.1 1.1 1.0 107 105 Chicago, Peoria, Quad Cities 834 17.2
46. Raley’s W. Sacramento, CA 1.1 1.1 1.8 64 179 San Francisco [+Westpac] 381(2) 4.5
EE EAppendix Table 2: continued
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47. Wal-Mart Bentonville, MO 0.4 1.1 7.0 47 141 21 GMAs 500 mi. from 704 1.2
EE E
Springfield, MO
48. Brookshire Grocery Tyler, TX 0.9 1.1 1.1 95 129 Dallas, Shreveport 1093(2) 2.3
EE E
49. Ingles Black Mountain, NC 1.0 1.1 1.2 171 173 Greenville, Atlanta 450 13.1
[+Merchants Distributors]
50. Purity Supreme N. Billerica, MA 1.5 1.0 0.9 58 108 Boston, Hartford, Portland ME 580 13.5
iE
51. Tom Thumb Dallas, TX 0.9 1.0 acqd 62 142 Dallas 650 19.1
mE E
52. Delchamp’s Mobile, AL 1.0 1.0 1.1 116 268 Birmingham, New Orleans 790(2) 8.9
Shreveport
53. Furr’s Albuquerque, AZ 1.0 0.9 0.9 78 94 El Paso [+Fleming] 900 35.5
EE E
54. Homeland Oklahoma City, OK 0.8 0.8 0.8 113 339 Oklahoma City, El Paso 1300 12.8
EE
55. Minyard’s Coppell, TX 0.7 0.7 0.8 79 163 Dallas [+Big Tex] 190(2) 15.4
56. Smitty’s Phoenix, AZ 0.8 0.7 0.6 28 84 Phoenix [+Fleming] 1000 3.4
EE
57. Quality Foods Intl. Los Angeles, CA 0.7 0.7 0.6 88 Los Angeles, San Francisco 369(3) 2.0
E
58. Village Super Mkt.  Springfield, NJ 0.7 0.7 0.7 25 49 [Wakefern] 0 0
59. Hughes Irwindale, CA 0.5 0.7 0.8 51 81 Los Angeles  300(2) 2.2
EE E
60. Farm Fresh Norfolk, VA 0.7 0.7 0.9 55 165 Norfolk [+Richfood] 200(2) 4.9
61. King Kullen Westbury, NY 0.7 0.7 0.7 47 101 NYC [+White Rose] 296(2) 1.9
62. Foodarama Freehold, NJ 0.7 0.7 0.6 26 26 [Wakefern] 0 0
63. Red Food Stores Chattanooga, TN 0.6 0.7 --- 64 130 Nashville 583 7.3
64. Shoppers Food Whs. Lanham, MD 0.4 0.7 0.7 35 35 Baltimore/Washington 96(2) 0.5
E
65. ABCO Markets Phoenix, AZ 0.7 0.6 0.6 75 167 Phoenix -[+Fleming] 100 2.9
66. Scott Grocery  Wilkes-Barre, PA 0 6 0.6 --- 7 11 Scranton 250 2.2
f
67. Fiesta Mart Houston, TX 0.5 0.6 0.6 29 85 [Grocers Supply] 0 0
E
68. Bashas’ Chandler, AZ 0.5 0.6 0.6 54 66 Pheonix 450 8.8
EE
69. Seaway Food Town Maumee, OH 0.5 0.6 0.6 47 81 Cincinnati 670 4.4
70. K-VA-T Food Grundy, VA 0.5 0.5 0.6 60 86 Nashville, Louisville, Raleigh 525 2.3
[+Mid-Mountain Foods]
71. Mayfair Elizabeth, NJ 0.6 0.5 0.6 31 73 [Twin City] 0 0
E
72. Appletree Houston, TX 1.0 0.5 0.1 97 97 Houston, San Antonio 400 10.1
nE E E
73. Big Y Foods Springfield, MA 0.4 0.5 30 30 Hartford [+C&S] 110(2) 1.8Appendix Table 2: continued
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74. Big V Supermarkets Florida, NY 0.6 0.5 0.7 27 79 [Wakefern] 0 0
E
75. Food Giant Sikeston, MO 0.3 0.5 0.3 86 90 [Fleming] 0 0
E
76. Inserra Mahwah, NJ 0.4 0.5 0.5 16 44 [Wakefern] 0 0
E
77. Food Barn Kansas City, MO 0.6 0.5 0.4 43 123 Kansas City, Wichita 675 10.3
EE
[+Assoc. Wholesale Grocers]
78. Schwegmann’s New Orleans, LA 0.4 0.5 0.5 16 48 New Orleans 250 2.6
EE
79. U.R.M. Stores  Spokane, WA 0.5 0.5 0.5 200 184 Spokane 483 30.6
E
80. Quality Food Bellevue, WA 0.3 0.5 0.6 36 36 [Westpac] 0 0
81. Brookshire Bros. Lufkin, TX 0.5 0.5 0.5 61 79 Houston 130 1.1
EE E
82. Red Apple NewYork, NY 0.5 0.5 0.2 88 88 [Krasdale, White Rose] 0 0
EE
83. Fred Albrecht Akron, OH 0.5 0.5 0.5 39 60 Cleveland 700 7.5
l E
84. Harvest Foods Little Rock, AR 0.5 0.5 0.4   54 76 Memphis, Shreveport 700 7.0
EE
85. Almacs Providence, RI 0.6 0.5 0.4 44 44 [Wetterau] 0 0
EE
86. United  Lubbock, TX 0.4 0.4 0.4 42 42 [Fleming] 0 0
E
87. Victory Markets Utica, NY 0.5 0.4 0.7 81 90 Syracuse [+C&S] 396 22.6
EE
88. Nob Hill Gilroy, CA 0.3 0.4 0.4 26 26 [Fleming] 0 0
E
89. Fareway Stores Boone, IA 0.3 0.4 0.5 56 56 Quad Cities, Omaha 600 3.5
E
90. Thriftway Cincinnati, OH 0.4 0.4 --- 23 69 Cincinnati [+Superfoods] 200 2.3
91. Wuest’s Seguin, TX 0.5 0.4 0.0 17 10 San Antonio 100 0.8
E
92. Ukrop’s Richmond, VA --- 0.4 0.5 51 57 [Richfood] 0 0
E
93. Canned Foods Berkeley, CA 0.3 0.4 0.4 78 234 San Francisco 250(2) 1.2
94. Melmarkets Garden City, NY 0.3 0.4 0.4 16 28 [Twin County] 0 0
E
95. Trader Joe’s S. Pasadina, CA 0.3 0.4 0.6 52 52 Los Angeles 150 0.8
96. Holiday Companies Bloomington, MN 0.3 0.4 0.5 319 307 Milwaukee, Green Bay 1406(4) 4.4
      (Fairco Wholesale) Minneapolis, Quad Cities,
Omaha
97. Genuardi Norristown, PA 0.3 0.4 0.5 28 25 Philadelphia --- ---
98. Lowes Food Strs. Winston-Salem, NC 0.3 0.3 0.4 52 52 [Merchants Distributors] 0 0
EE
99. Foodland  Honolulu, HI 0.2 0.3 0.4 28 40 [Fleming] 0 0
100. Gooding’s Altamonte Sprgs., FL 0.2 0.3 0.3 17 43 Jacksonville [+Wetterau] 30 0.5
E
101. Waremart Boise, ID 0.2 0.3 0.5 18 54 Spokane, Portland OR, 520(2) 2.1
k E
Salt Lake CityAppendix Table 2: continued
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102. Dierbergs Markets Chesterfield, MO 0.3 0.3 0.3 14 40 [Supervalu] 0 0
EE
103. Hyper Shoppes Milford, OH 0.3 0.3 0.5 7 35 [Supervalu] 0 0
104. Thomas & Howard Spartanburg, SC --- 0.3 --- 275 63 Greenville [+unknown] 47 ---
E
105. M&E Food Mart Nederland, TX 0.2 0.3 0.2 38 48 Houston [+Grocers Supply] --- 2.4
106. D&W Food Ctrs. Grand Rapids, MI 0.4 0.3 0.4 22 22 [Spartan] 0 0
E
107. Megafoods Stores Mesa, AZ 0.2 0.3 0.5 23 69 [Fleming] 0 0
EE
108. Pueblo Intl. Pompano, FL 0.3 0.3 0.3 10 30 Miami [+Fleming] 125 ---
EE E
109. Kings Super W. Caldwell, NJ 0.3 0.3 0.3 19 19 [White Rose] 0 0
E
110. Haggen Bellingham, WA 0.2 0.3 0.4 11 29 [Supervalu] 0 0
111. Ball’s Food Kansas City, KS 0.2 0.3 0.4 17 45 [Asso. Wholesale Grocers] 0 0
112. Keith Uddenberg Gig Harbor, WA 0.3 0.3 0.3 24 62 [Asso. Grocers] 0 0
113. Stanley Stores Bay City, TX 0.3 0.3 0.2 31 63 [Grocers Supply] 0 0
E
114. Consumers Springfield, MO 0.4 0.3 --- 26 62 [Fleming] 0 0
E
115. Houchens  Bowling Green, KY 0.3 0.3 0.3 79 51 [Wetterau] 0 0
116. Gerland’s  Houston, TX 0.3 0.3 0.2 21 59 [Grocers Supply] 0 0
E
117. Super Discount Lithia Springs, GA 0.2 0.3 0.3 9 27 [Supervalu] 0 0
EE
118. Byrd Food Burlington, NC 0.2 0.3 0.2 45 45 Charlotte [+Scrivner, Richfood] 300 ---
E
119. Jerry’s Edina, MN 0.2 0.3 0.3 13 21 [Supervalu] 0 0
120. Niemann Quincy, IL 0.2 0.3 0.3 20 39 [Supervalu, Wetterau] 0 0
121. Sav-A-Lot St. Louis, MO --- 0.3 --- 360 72 Approx. 16-20 GMAs 720(6) ---
E
        (Wetterau) From MO to NJ to FL to TX.
Smaller retailers with some integration:
J.H. Harvey Nashville, TN 0.2 0.2 0.3 38 38 Nashville 125 ---
E
John Groub Seymour, IN 0.2 0.2 0.2 29 37 Indianapolis 430(2) 3.5
E
B&B Cash Grocery Tampa, FL 0.2 0.2 0.2 56 30 Jacksonville 225 1.9
E
Cala Foods Hayward, CA 0.2 0.2 --- 23 23 San Francisco 370(3) 1.7
[+Certified Grocers of LA]
Big Bear San Diego, CA 0.2 0.2 --- 25 24 Los Angeles 165(2) 1.0
Heinen’s Warrensville, OH 0.1 0.1 0.1 11 19 Cleveland 360 2.5
E
Fisher Foods Canton, OH 0.1 0.1 0.1 6 6 Cleveland 70 1.9
EAppendix Table 2: continued
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H.G. Hill Nashville, TN 0.1 0.1 0.1 14 14 Nashville 208 3.1
Autry Greer Pritchard, AL 0.1 0.1 0.1 41 41 New Orleans 116 1.9
Shop N’ Save Grand Prairie, TX 0.1 0.1 0.1 30 6 Dallas 180(2) 0.7
Fedco Santa Fe Springs, CA 0.1 0.1 0.1 9 9 Los Angeles 420 0.3
EE
Dixie Saving Stores Chattanooga, TN 0.1 0.1 0.1 120 40 no GMA 302 ---
 = Estimated
E
--- = Not available or not applicable
This column lists conventional-supermarket equivalents.  Conventional supermarkets are counted as one; convenience and limited-assortment stores are
a
weighted 0.2; and large stores (super, combination, warehouse, etc.) a weight of 3.0.
See Table 6 for a list of grocery marketing areas (GMAs).
b
Square footage of warehouses owned and operated by the retail company.  The number of separate warehouses is given in parentheses where known, but
c
not all companies report the number of facilities.  If integrated, name of GMA is shown; if partially integrated name of wholesaler appears after the plus
sign in the square brackets; if unintegrated, only name of wholesaler appears in square brackets.
The average share of GMA retail sales represented by the retailers’ wholesale activity.  If the retailer supplies only a portion of its wholesale products
d
(partial or “tapered” integration), then only that portion is counted.  The total market shares in each GMA are divided by the number of GMAs listed in the
column to the left.  Some smaller shares are estimated.  See also Table 6.
Owned and operated Top’s, Bi-Lo, First National, and Giant Foods of PA.  Giant Foods is partially supplied by Super Rite Foods.
e
Scott Grocery appears to derive most of its sales from wholesaling activity.
f
Food 4 Less purchased about 130 supermarkets from the Alpha Beta division of Amercian Stores in 1991.  Store and warehouse information refers to
g
1991-1992 situation.  Its Falley’s division in Kansas City is not integrated.
Penn Traffic Co. owns a voluntary wholesaler (P&C Food Markets, Syracuse) and retailers in Pittsburgh (Bi-Lo, Riverside), Columbus (Big Bear), and
h
Buffalo (Quality Markets).
Purity Supreme was reported in some sources to be owned by American Stores in 1990, but was sold to Freeman & Spogli around 1992.  
iAppendix Table 2: continued
58
By 1993, after acquisition of Giant by Sainsbury’s, Super Rite was no longer listed as a supplier.
j
In 1992, Supervalu sold its Salem, Oregon warehouse to Waremart, Inc. and simultaneously purchased a minority share in Waremart.
k
Also operates a foodservice distribution business.
l
Randall’s acquired Tom Thumb (formerly Cullum Cos.) in 1993.
m
In bankruptcy 1991-92.  When Chapter 11 ended (11/92) Appletree owned only 50 supermarkets.
n59
Appendix Table 3: Warehouse Operations of U.S. Merchant Grocery Wholesalers, 1990.
                               Company                                    Wholesale Sales                                                   Warehouse Operations                 
c d
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Rank/Name                                    Location            1990   1992   1994        Grocery Market Areas                                      Size                 GMA
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Share          
                                                                                   Billion dollars                                                                                ‘000 ft. Percent
2                    
1.  Fleming Companies     Oklahoma City, OK 12.0 12.9 15.8 31 13420(33) 9.0
b
2.  Super Valu Minneapolis, MN 11.1 12.6 16.6 23 11520(21) 11.3
ab
3.  Scrivner Oklahoma City, OK 5.4 6.2 acqd 20 5964(21) 5.9
b
4.  Wetterau Hazelwood, MO 5.3 5.0 acqd 17 7151(22) 9.9
ab
5.  Wakefern Elizabeth, NJ 3.2 3.6 3.7 4 2500(4) 10.0
Eb
6.  Penn Traffic Co. Johnstown, PA 2.7 2.8 3.3 7 2332(4) 9.7
b
7.  Certified Grocers Los Angeles, CA 2.3 2.8 1.9 2 3003(4) 11.6
b
8.  Roundy’s Pewaukee, WI 2.3 2.5 2.5 9 1895(5) 6.5
b
9.  Nash Finch Minneapolis, MN 2.2 2.4 2.8 8 2006(8) 4.5
b
10.Associated Grocers  Kansas City, KS 1.9 2.4 2.6 3 1151(3) 13.1
b
11.Spartan Stores Grand Rapids, MI 1.9 2.1 2.2 Detroit, Grand Rapids 1875 26.5
E
12.Super Food Services Dayton, OH 1.7 1.6 1.1 Cincinnati, Detroit 916 12.2
13.Grocers Supply Houston, TX 1.2 1.4 1.5 Houston, San Antonio, Dallas 2114(3) 17.9
fE E E
14.Super Rite Harrisburg, PA 0.8 1.3 1.5 Scranton, Philadelphia 632 8.4
15.C&S Wholesale Brattleboro, VT 0.7 1.3 1.8 Boston, Portland, Hartford, 625 7.1
Albany
16.Twin County Edison, NJ 1.0 1.2 1.1 New York City 900 7.5
EE
17.P.J. Schmitt Akron, OH 1.1 1.1 --- Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Cleveland 1668 10.8
EE
18.Associated Grocers  Seattle, WA 1.0 1.1 1.1 Spokane, Seattle 1151 13.1
19.Richfood Mechanicsville,VA 1.0 1.1 1.5 Norfolk, Raleigh 1900 15.7
20.Foodland Distributors Livonia, MI 0.7 1.1 0.9 Detroit 943 19.1
E
21.Riser Foods Bedford Hts., OH 0.9 1.0 1.1 Cleveland 450 18.5
E
22.Sweet Life Foods Suffield, CT 0.9 1.0 acqd Boston, Portland, Hartford, 1357 5.2
EE
Albany
23.United Grocers Portland, OR 0.8 0.9 1.0 Portland, OR 842 24.760
24.Associated Food Stores Salt Lake City, UT 0.7 0.8 0.8 Salt Lake City 656 31.0
25.Merchants Distributors Hickory, NC 0.6 0.7 0.8 Raleigh, Charlotte, Greesville 850 14.3
EE
26.White Rose Farmingdale, CT 0.9 0.7 1.0 New York City 665 8.8
EE
27.Market wholesale San Rafael, CA 0.4 0.7 0.5 San Francisco 625 6.6
E
28.Certified Grocers  Hodgkins, IL 0.6 0.6 0.7 Chicago 1200 9.3
     Midwest
29.Key Food Stores Coop. Brooklyn, NY 0.6 0.6 0.6 New York City 500 5.0
30.B. Green Baltimore, MD 0.5 0.6 --- Batimore 836 13.3
E
31.Affiilated Foods Amarillo, TX 0.5 0.5 0.7 Dallas, El Paso 1400 10.0
32.Piggly Wiggly Carolina Charleston, SC 0.5 0.5 0.6 Charleston SC 475 18.2
EE E
33.U.R.M. Stores Spokane, WA 0.5 0.5 0.5 Spokane 483 27.8
E
34.Schultz Sav-O-Stores Sheboygan, WI 0.5 0.5 0.4 Green Bay, Milwaukee 432 12.2
35.Affiliated Foods Coop. Norfolk, NE 0.4 0.5 0.5 Omaha 750 5.8
36.Krasdale Foods White Plains, NY 0.4 0.5 0.5 New York City 400 3.8
E
37.Fairway/Fairco Minneapolis, MN 0.6 0.5 --- Minneapolis, Omaha, Quad Cities 836 5.1
E
38.Affiliated Foods SW Little Rock, AR 0.5 0.5 0.5 Memphis 325 12.6
E
39.Certified Grocers of FL Ocala, FL 0.5 0.4 --- Jacksonville 900 4.2
E
40.Central Grocers Coop. Franklin Park, IL 0.3 0.4 0.4 Chicago 523 6.7
41.Associated Wholesalers Robesonia, PA 0.3 0.4 0.4 Scranton, Baltimore 1169 8.0
ee
42.Copps Stevens Point, WI 0.3 0.4 0.4 Milwaukee, Green Bay 302 9.8
E
43.Lewis Bear Co. Pensacola, FL 0.3 0.4 --- (None) --- ---
44.Piggly Wiggly AL Bessemer, AL 0.3 0.4 0.4 Birmingham 528 8.9
45.Affiliated Food Stores Keller, TX 0.8 0.3 --- Dallas 1000 10.3
46.United A-G Cooperative Omaha, NE 0.3 0.3 0.2 Omaha 525 16.8
47.Buzzuto’s  Cheshire, CT 0.3 0.3 0.3 Hartford 245 3.9
48.Tarmarkin Youngstown, OH 0.3 0.3 --- Pittsburgh, Cleveland 450 9.3
EE
49.Camellia Norfolk, VA 0.2 0.3 0.2 Norfolk 330 9.9
E
50.Associated Food Stores Jamaica, NY 0.2 0.2 0.1 New York City 500 0.9
51.Associated Grocers Baton Rouge, LA 0.2 0.3 0.3 New Orleans 465 7.9
52.Affiliated Food Stores Tulsa, OK  0.2 0.3 0.3 Oklahoma City 547 11.8
53.Mid-Mountain Foods Abington, VA 0.2 0.3 --- Raleigh, Louisville, Nashville 525 2.0
54.James Ferrera & Sons Canton, MA 0.2 0.3 0.3 Boston 420 1.461
55.Allied Grocers Coop Windsor, CT 0.3 0.2 --- Hartford 300 6.7
56.Asso. Grocers of FL Miami, FL 0.3 0.2 0.2 Miami 450 5.8
E
57.Cardinal Foods Columbus, OH 0.2 0.2 --- Cincinnati 375 6.0
E
58.Hale-Halsell Tulsa, OK 0.2 0.2 0.2 Oklahoma City 330 6.7
E
59.C.B. Ragland Nashville, TN 0.2 0.2 0.2 Nashville 325 9.5
60.Affiliated of FL Tampa, FL 0.2 0.2 0.2 Jacksonville 350 1.4
EE
61.Asso. Grocers of AL Birmingham, AL 0.2 0.2 0.2 Birmingham 401 9.9
62.Affiliated Food Dist. Scranton, PA 0.2 0.2 --- Scranton, Baltimore 1169 8.0
e e
63.Mitchell Grocery Albertville, AL 0.2 0.2 0.3 Birmingham 320 5.6
E
64.Olean Whlsl. Grocery Olean, NY 0.2 0.2 0.2 Buffalo 350 5.6
In late 1992, Wetterau became part of Super Valu.  Wetterau’s estimated separate sales are shown for 1992, but Super Valu’s 1992 sales are
a
consolidated, post merger sales.
See Table 8 for details on the GMAs of the ten leading wholesalers.
b
Sales mostly from Progressive Grocer, but adjusted upward if SAMI data indicate.  Cut-off is approximately $200 million in annual sales.
c
SAMI markets cover about 80% of U.S. retail grocery sales.  Share is measured by retail sales of stores served in the SAMI GMAs.
d
Associated and Affiliated were legally independent companies but apparently jointly operated their warehouses.
e
Ownership is unclear.  GSC Enterprises of Sulfur Springs, Texas owns Grocers Supply Co. Of San Antonio ($703 million sales and a 700,000 ft.
f 2
warehouse) and claims to supply 5000 stores in 8 states.  Grocers Supply Co. of Houston has a large warehouse serving 1300 stores in TX and LA but is
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